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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the district court erred in holding that Suave, Inc. did
not violate the Clean Water Act (CWA) because Sheldrake Pond is
not navigable water under the CWA §§ 33 U.S.C. 1311(a), 1362(7)
and (12), and; whether this case is governed by the amendment
made to § 1362(7) in 2001 and if so whether that amendment ex-
tends the jurisdiction of the CWA over Sheldrake Pond.
2. Whether the district court erred in holding that neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Treaty Clause of the Constitution jus-
tify federal regulation of water pollution in Sheldrake Pond.
3. Whether the district court erred in holding that fired shot and
skeet parts are not solid waste when they fall to the ground under
the Environmental Protection Agency's definition of solid waste in
40 C.F.R. § 261.2.
4. Whether the district court erred in holding that fired shot and
skeet parts are not solid waste when they fall to the ground under
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge Romulus in
the United States District Court for the District of New Union on
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The district court,
in its decision below, dismissed a suit initially brought by
Birdwatchers of Groveton, Inc. ("BOG") against Suave Real
Properties, Inc. ("Suave"), seeking civil penalties and injunctive
relief under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). (R. at 3-4). The district court granted Suave's motion
in its entirety, and justified its decision on two grounds. The court
held that BOG's action does not fall under the coverage of the
CWA because Sheldrake Pond was not a "navigable water" in ei-
ther a statutory or a constitutional sense; and that the action was
not proper under RCRA because Suave's disposal of skeet parts
and lead shot did not constitute the disposal of solid waste. (R. at
4).
The district court had previously granted the United States'
motion to intervene in the action on behalf of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). (R. at 1). The United
States is now an appellant in this case, challenging the lower
court's holding that Sheldrake Pond is not statutorily or constitu-
tionally a navigable water for purposes of the CWA, as well as the
court's holding that the skeet parts and lead shot discharged by
Suave are not solid waste under RCRA. The United States does
support one portion of the lower court's ruling. That is, that fired
shot and skeet parts do not fall under the EPA's regulations at 40
C.F.R. § 261.2. The United States, however, opposes the ultimate
judgment of the lower court, dismissing BOG's action against
Suave.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
BOG is a non-profit corporation whose members are
birdwatchers who live in Groveton County. (R. at 3). Its members
watched birds on Sheldrake Pond from Groveton County land for
at least 20 years until the year 2000 when Suave began operating
a shooting range near the pond. (R. at 3). Over that period of
time, members of the organization observed numerous species of
birds, including many species of migratory birds. (R. at 3).
Sheldrake Pond is a long, narrow, shallow pond. It is dry dur-
ing part of the year, and during the wet season it does not exceed
2002] 559
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four feet in depth or twenty-five acres in extent. (R. at 3). It is an
important stopover for many species of migratory birds.
Suave is a real estate management company which operates
the Groveton Rifle and Pistol Association ("GRAPA") near Shel-
drake Pond. (R. at 3). Suave owns land to the west and south of
the Pond, and part of the western end of the Pond itself. The re-
mainder of the Pond and surrounding land is owned by Groveton
County. (R. at 3).
The GRAPA facility owned by Suave contains a firing range, a
pad for skeet shooters to stand on, and a device which launches
skeet into the air. The skeet launching device sits on a platform
at the western end of the Pond. In order for the platform to be
built Suave filled a portion of the western end of the Pond. (R. at
3).
Skeet from the ejection device is launched over Sheldrake
Pond, while skeet shooters stand a distance back from the pond
and attempt to shoot the ejected skeet. (R. at 3). Whether the
material is hit or missed by the skeet shooters, skeet parts and
lead shot fall into and around the Pond. Lead bullets from the
firing range are also occasionally discharged into the Pond. (R. at
3-4). Both the skeet, lead shot and bullets commonly fall into both
the county-owned portions of the Pond and surrounding land as
well as onto areas owned by Suave. (R. at 3-4).
On December 20, 2000, BOG filed a complaint against Suave
under provisions of both the CWA and RCRA. First, BOG alleges
that Suave is violating the CWA by putting and maintaining fill
material into the Pond, which BOG alleges is a navigable water,
without a permit provided for under 33 U.S.C. § 1344. BOG main-
tains that this constitutes a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). BOG
further alleges that the skeet parts, lead shot, and bullets which
are discharged into the Pond constitute a discharge of fill materi-
als and/or pollutants into a navigable water without a CWA per-
mit, also in violation of 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). BOG seeks both civil
penalties and injunctive relief against Suave.
BOG alleges that Suave's actions violate RCRA as well. First,
it alleges that Suave's discharges violate 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) be-
cause they constitute a disposal of hazardous waste without a
RCRA permit. BOG asks the court to remedy this portion of the
alleged RCRA violations by issuing an injunction and assessing
civil penalties against Suave. BOG also alleges that Suave's dis-
posal of skeet, lead shot and bullets in and around the pond cre-
560 [Vol. 20
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ates a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) by creating
an imminent and substantial endangerment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal seeks a reversal of the district court's grant of
summary judgement. The district court's dismissal of the claims
which BOG brought under the CWA and RCRA present a legal
issue. In reviewing questions of law, the court must apply a de
novo standard of review. Bechtel Cont. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50
F.3d 926, 931 (11th Cir. 1995); Salde Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499
U.S. 1217 (1991). A de novo standard of review is the standard
the court must apply in this case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This court should reverse those portions of the district court's
holding which held that Sheldrake Pond is not a navigable water
and thus cannot be regulated under the CWA, that extending CWA
jurisdiction over the pond would exceed Congress' constitutional
authority, and that the fired shot and skeet parts discharged by
Suave are not solid waste within the meaning of the statutory def-
inition contained in RCRA. This court should affirm the portion of
the district court's holding that found that the fired shot and skeet
parts do not fall within the narrow regulatory definition of solid
waste contained at 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2001).
First, Sheldrake Pond is a navigable water and thus, falls
under the CWA. Under the statute and regulatory definitions as
they existed at the time the complaint was filed, the pond consti-
tutes a navigable water. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994); 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3 (2001); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 230.3(s) (2001). Aside from
this, the 2001 amendment to the definitional section of the CWA
governs this case. A grant of injunctive relief under the amend-
ment would not have retroactive effect. American Steel Foundries
v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 201 (1921).
Thus, the traditional presumption against retroactivity does not
apply and the amendment should be applied with respect to such
relief. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). Fur-
ther, there is evidence of congressional intent that the amendment
apply to cases pending at the time of its enactment. This intent
may be discerned from the legislative history of the statute. Ohio
ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff,562 F. Supp. 1300, 1309 (D.C. Ohio
1983). Due to the presence of this clear congressional intent, the
statute must be applied retroactively to grant civil penalties
2002]
11
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
against Suave, even in the face of the traditional presumption
against retroactivity. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277.
Second, the district court erred in holding that Congress can-
not regulate, small, isolated ponds used by migratory birds as
resting places. Ponds like Sheldrake Pond are subject to regula-
tion pursuant to the Commerce Clause because they are channels
of interstate commerce, are utilized by instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce and because lack of regulation would have a sub-
stantial affect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995). The established use of Sheldrake Pond by
migratory birds makes the pond a channel of interstate commerce.
See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995).
The birds themselves have been recognized as instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. See id. at 1393-94. The cumulative affect of
a lack of regulation on ponds like Sheldrake Pond would have a
detrimental effect on interstate commerce. See National Ass'n of
Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
The district court also erred in ruling that Congress may not
regulate Sheldrake Pond and similarly situated bodies of water
pursuant to its treaty powers. In its opinion the district court in-
dicated that ruling that the Treaty Powers permitted regulation of
Sheldrake Pond would, in effect, allow Congress to regulate an
area that it could not otherwise regulate under the Commerce
Clause. (R. at 5). However, Congress may take such steps as are
necessary and proper to implement treaties. See Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920). Congress has stated that one of
the purposes of the CWA is the protection of wildlife in general.
See S. Rep. No. 99-445 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6113. Therefore, it would appear that Congress simply meant
that the CWA function as another means of effectuating the sev-
eral treaties that the United States has entered into for the pro-
tection of migratory birds and other wildlife in general.
Third, the court correctly held lead shot and skeet parts are
not solid waste under the regulatory definition of solid waste. 40
C.F.R. § 261.2. (2001). The EPA's regulatory definition of solid
waste is only intended to cover those materials that are subtitle C
hazardous waste. See Conn. Coastal Fisherman's Assoc. v. Rem-
ington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1993). "Dual defini-
tions of solid waste are suggested by the structure and language of
RCRA." Id. at 1315. Suave's discarded lead shot and skeet parts
are materials used for their intended purpose and are therefore
562 [Vol. 20
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outside the regulatory definition of solid waste. See Military Tox-
ics Project v. United States EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Finally, the court erred by finding that lead shot and skeet
parts are not solid waste for purposes of 42 U.S.C.(a)(1)(B) (1994).
The court incorrectly held lead shot and skeet parts were not solid
waste under the statutory definition because the court misapplied
the consumer use exception. See Long Island Soundkeeper Fund
v. N.Y. Athletic Club, unreported, No. 94 Civ. 0436 (RPP) 1996 WL
131863 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1996). When RCRA was enacted it
was clear that Congress wanted to regulate solid waste that had
served its intended purpose and was not longer wanted by the con-
sumer. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1419(I), at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6240. The broad definition of solid waste in
RCRA includes "any discarded material" but does not include
products that are still useful. Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at
951. Lead shot and skeet parts are not products that are still use-
ful but have served their intended purpose and are no longer
wanted by Suave. The EPA's interpretation of the statutory defi-
nition was developed under the authority given the EPA by Con-
gress. As it is a reasonable interpretation it should be applied in
this case. Therefore, this court should hold that lead shot and
skeet parts are solid waste under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) and
create an imminent and substantial hazard to health and the
environment.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
SHELDRAKE POND IS NOT A NAVIGABLE WATER
UNDER THE CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7) &
(12), AND THAT THIS CASE IS NOT COVERED
BY THE 2001 AMENDMENT TO 1362(7), WHICH
WOULD CLEARLY EXTEND CWA JURISDICTION
OVER THE POND
Unless a permit has been issued to allow it, section 301 of the
Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant, which
by definition includes solid waste, into a navigable water. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (1994). However, to be covered by the
CWA prohibition, a water body must fall within the definition of a
"navigable water." The term is defined in section 502 to mean
"waters of the United States." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994). This
definition is elaborated on by the regulations set forth by the EPA
20021 563
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and the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3
(2001); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 230.3(s) (2001). The district court erro-
neously held Sheldrake Pond is not a "navigable water" and thus,
that Suave's discharges into the Pond do not fall under the CWA
prohibition.
A. Sheldrake Pond is a navigable water under 33 U.S.C.
§1362(7) as it existed at the time the complaint was filed
The CWA regulates discharges into navigable waters, which it
defines as waters of the United States. The EPA and the Corps
both of which enforce the CWA, have regulations defining the term
"waters of the United States." See 33 C.F.R § 328.3 (2001); 40
C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 230.3(s) (2001). The definitions of this term put
forth by both agencies include:
all waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, in-
cluding.. .intrastate... wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or
destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,
including any such waters . . . which are or could be used by
interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes
Id.
In 1986, in an attempt to "clarify" the reach of its jurisdiction
under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3, the Corps stated in what became known
as the Migratory Bird Rule that CWA jurisdiction extends to intra-
state waters "[wihich are or would be used as habitat by birds pro-
tected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or ... [wihich are or would be
used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state
lines. . .." 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 (1986). On January 9, 2001, the
Supreme Court issued Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
("SWANCC"). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Mi-
gratory Bird Rule as applied to the site in the case, was unenforce-
able because it exceeded the authority granted to the Corps under
the CWA. Id. at 174. It is clear, under this decision, that the mere
presence of migratory birds will not be enough to extend CWA ju-
risdiction to a site. It is important to note that the site at issue in
the SWANCC case was not a wetland, rather, it was an aban-
doned sand and gravel pit which was being used by migratory
birds. The Court did not, however, strike down any part of the
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underlying regulation which the Migratory Bird Rule was in-
tended to clarify. Id. The Court's decision in SWANCC, there-
fore, did not reach the question of whether isolated wetlands may
fall under the definition of waters of the United States, and thus
be a navigable water on a basis other than those covered in the
Migratory Bird Rule. United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp.2d
983, 988 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
The lower court based its grant of summary judgment with
respect to the CWA portions of the complaint, on the fact that the
SWANCC decision clearly would not allow jurisdiction to extend
over isolated wetlands. However, it is clear from the holding of
that case as well as the discussion of the district court in Krilich,
that the SWANCC decision was not so far reaching. While the
Court's decision did limit the reach of the CWA somewhat, the reg-
ulations promulgated by the EPA and the Corps which define the
term "waters of the United States" are clearly left intact. In
SWANCC the Court chose not to determine the exact meaning of
"navigable waters" as used in the CWA. U.S. v. Interstate General
Co., 152 F. Supp.2d 843 (D. Md. 2001). In doing so, the Supreme
Court stated, "The exact meaning of [the term navigable waters as
used in §404(g) of the CWA] is not before us and we express no
opinion on it." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171. Under the regulations,
the power of Congress to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
at least some non-navigable waters is indisputable. Congress can
clearly regulate discharges of pollutants that could substantially
affect interstate commerce. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-
59 (1995).
In the case at hand, Sheldrake Pond clearly falls within the
purview of the regulatory scheme without any necessity for reli-
ance on the Migratory Bird Rule's clarification. Major portions of
the Pond are county land and therefore, are open to use by the
public. Sheldrake Pond is a wetland or natural pond which is or
could be used by interstate travelers for recreational purposes.
Aside from containing many species of birds, at a depth of 4 feet
and a size of 25 acres Sheldrake Pond could also be used for raft-
ing, wading, swimming, and other recreational purposes. Courts
have discussed ponds on private lands with respect to their recre-
ational value. State of Cal. Ex rel. State Water Resource Control
Bd. v. F.E.R.C., 966 F.2d 1541, 1550 n.2 (1992); see also Swift v.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., unreported, No. 94C2117, 1996 WL
437346 at * 3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 1996). Clearly, if ponds on private
land have recreational value for the public at large, a pond on pub-
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lic land has even greater value for public recreation. As such
Sheldrake Pond clearly falls within the regulatory framework and
is subject to regulation under the CWA. Therefore, the Court's de-
cision in SWANCC does not reach the determination of this case,
and Sheldrake Pond clearly falls under 33 U.S.C. §1362(7) as it
existed before the 2001 amendment.
B. Even if Sheldrake Pond were held not to be a navigable
water under the previous version of the statute, the 2001
Amendment governs this case, and extends CWA
jurisdiction over the Pond
In August of 2001, in response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in SWANCC, Congress amended the CWA's definition of"nav-
igable waters." Water Pollution Protection Act of 2001, P.L. 106-
720. Under the amendment, the CWA definition was extended to
incorporate the EPA's definition of "waters of the United States"
from 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. P.L. 106-720 (2001). Due to the 2001
amendment, the statutory definition of "navigable waters" now ex-
pressly includes intrastate waters such as playa lakes, "wetlands,"
prairie potholes, wet meadows, and natural ponds whose degrada-
tion could affect interstate commerce, including such waters
which could be used by interstate travelers for recreational pur-
poses. Id. Thus, even if this court finds that the SWANCC deci-
sion invalidated the regulations defining "waters of the United
States" as beyond the statutory authority of the agency, the statu-
tory amendment constitutes a legislative overruling of that deci-
sion, and clearly extends jurisdiction over such waters as the
regulation would have covered. Because Sheldrake Pond would
clearly fall under the definition of the 2001 amendment under the
playa lake, natural pond, and wetland provisions, the application
of the amendment would extend CWA jurisdiction over this case.
Further, because it overrules the SWANCC case, the 2001
amendment implicitly authorizes the use of the Migratory Bird
Rule. The legislative history of the amendment makes this clear
stating that the SWANCC case misinterpreted congressional in-
tent and acknowledging the importance of migratory birds. S.
Rep. 106-528, p. 23 (2001). Under the 2001 amendment CWA ju-
risdiction is clearly extended over isolated, purely intrastate wa-
ters which provide important stopping points for migratory birds.
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1. Under the Landgraf/Lindh analysis the 2001
amendment should be applied to this case
The Supreme Court has set forth a test for courts to use in
determining whether a newly enacted statutory provision may be
applied to pending cases. Because such a question is at issue in
the case at hand, this test must be used by the court to determine
whether application of the 2001 amendment to this case would be
appropriate.
The framework for this analysis comes out of two cases: Lan-
dgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) and Lindh v. Mur-
phy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under the Landgraf two-step analysis:
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the
events in suit, the court's first task is to determine whether
Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach. If
Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to
judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no
such express command, the court must determine whether the
new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a
party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with re-
spect to transactions already completed. If the statute would
operate retroactively, [there is a strong presumption against
such application] absent clear congressional intent favoring
such a result.
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. In Lindh the Court added another step
to this analysis, holding that ordinary rules of construction still
apply, and "may remove even the possibility of retroactivity (as by
rendering the statutory provision wholly inapplicable to a particu-
lar case) .... " Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326.
A fairly complex analysis results from the application of Lan-
dgraf and Lindh. First, the court must look for an express com-
mand from Congress as to whether the statute should or should
not reach pending cases. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263. If there is
such an express directive, the court must follow it. If there is no
such direct command, the court must then apply traditional rules
of statutory construction to determine whether Congress mani-
fested an intent, through the statutory language, that the statute
be applied only to cases filed after its enactment. Lindh, 521 U.S.
at 326. If it is clear from the statutory language under normal
construction rules, that the statute was not intended to apply to
pending cases, the court must defer to that intent.
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In the absence of either an express directive or a clear intent
to have a statute apply only to future cases, a court must deter-
mine whether the statute would have retroactive effect. Lan-
dgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. A statute cannot be considered to operate
retroactively merely due to the fact that it is applied to a case aris-
ing from conduct which occurred before the statute was enacted,
or because it disappoints a party's expectations based on prior
law. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269. Justice Story set forth the classic
definition of retroactivity in 1814, stating that a retroactive appli-
cation is one which "creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or consider-
ations already in the past.. . ." Society for Propagating the Gospel
v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814). Statutes "con-
ferring or ousting jurisdiction" and those which change procedural
rules are types of laws which can generally be applied without
"raising concerns about their retroactivity." Landgraf, 511 U.S.
274-75. If a statute is found not to have a retroactive effect then it
may be applied to the pending case.
If the statutory amendment is found to have a retroactive ef-
fect courts fapply a presumption that Congress did not intend the
statute to operate retroactively. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 277. This
presumption may be rebutted through evidence of congressional
intent that the statute should apply to pending cases. This can be
determined through both language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history. Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300,
1309 (D.C. Ohio 1983).
a. Application of the 2001 amendment would not have
a retroactive effect
The statutory amendment in this case has no express direc-
tive as to its temporal reach. Such a command would generally
say something like, "[t]he new provisions shall apply to all pro-
ceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment."
Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 354 (1998). Because a clear state-
ment of this nature is not present in the language of the amend-
ment, the inquiry turns to whether normal rules of statutory
construction would preclude the amendment's application to pend-
ing cases. Again, such statutory language is not present in the
case at hand. Therefore, the examination of whether the 2001
statutory amendment may be applied to the case at hand, which
was pending at the time of its enactment, begins with the question
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of whether application of the amendment would have a retroactive
effect.
The inquiry into whether a statute has a retroactive effect
"demands a commonsense, functional judgment about 'whether
the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events com-
pleted before its enactment."' Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 357-
58 (1998)(citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). In making this judg-
ment, the court must be guided by "considerations of fair notice,
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations." Martin, 527 U.S.
at 358. In this case a grant of injunctive relief as sought by BOG
in its complaint against Suave would have no retroactive effect,
and thus should be granted.
In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Coun-
cil, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), the Supreme Court considered the propri-
ety of granting injunctive relief against picketers under a statute
which was passed while the case was on appeal. Id. The Court
determined that injunctive relief was proper, stating that "relief
by injunction operates in futuro and the right to it must be deter-
mined as of the time of the hearing." Id. at 201. In other words, a
grant on injunctive relief under a statute enacted after an action
is filed cannot be retroactive because injunctive relief is aimed
only at regulating future conduct. Thus, such relief does not at-
tach new legal consequences to conduct which is in the past.
The Supreme Court's decision in American Steel Foundries
applies to this case. In the case at hand, plaintiffs seek injunctive
relief to prevent Suave from continuing to discharge lead shot and
skeet parts into Sheldrake Pond. Because such relief is inherently
prospective, the traditional presumption against retroactivity
does not apply. The application of CWA jurisdiction over Shel-
drake Pond clearly is not retroactive as to a grant of injunctive
relief. Because a grant of an injunction under the 2001 amend-
ment would have no retroactive effect, such relief is proper under
the Landgraf/Lindh analysis.
b. There is clear evidence of congressional intent that
the amendment should apply to pending cases
Assuming that a grant of civil penalties against Suave under
the 2001 amendment to the CWA would have a retroactive effect,
the presumption against retroactive application of statutes ap-
plies. However, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence of
congressional intent that the amendment apply to cases which
were pending at the time of its enactment. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at
2002]
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277. Such evidence is present in this case and therefore, the court
must apply the amendment to this case.
In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72 (1982), the Su-
preme Court considered a case which fell, in part, under an
amendment made to an existing law while the case was on appeal.
The majority decided the case assuming that the amendment
would apply, but finding that it would not affect the outcome. Id.
at 87-8. The dissent argued that the application of the amend-
ment should change the outcome of the case. Id. at 90, (Brennan,
J. dissenting). More importantly, in its discussion, the dissent ex-
plained the rationale for applying the statutory amendment to
cases which were on appeal at the time of its enactment. The dis-
sent pointed out that the legislative history suggested congres-
sional intent that the amendment apply to cases pending at the
time of its enactment. Id. at 90, n.1 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
Statements from the sponsors of the amendment explaining the
intended effect were the pieces of legislative history which led the
dissent to the conclusion that retroactive application was contem-
plated by Congress. Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting). These state-
ments manifested express disapproval of certain lower court
holdings which were then on appeal. Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
The dissent inferred from this apparent desire to overrule certain
court cases, that the amendment should be applied to pending
cases.
Cases have similarly found congressional intent for retroac-
tive application of a statute in cases involving the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CER-
CLA"). In Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 232 F.3d 162
(3rd Cir. 2000), the court of appeals noted that CERCLA applies
retroactively although the statute does not expressly mandate
such application. Id. at 170. In making its determination that
CERCLA would apply retroactively in that case, the court looked
at the legislative history. "According to that history, the Act 'pro-
vides for relief from liability for both retroactive and prospective
transactions."' Id. Due to this express statement in the legislative
history as to CERCLA's temporal reach, the court held that the
statute should apply retroactively.
In the instant case the legislative history does not expressly
state the intent of Congress as to whether the 2001 amendment to
the CWA should apply retroactively. However, the legislative his-
tory makes it even more clear than in the Kaiser Steel case that
Congress did intend the amendment to apply to cases pending at
[Vol. 20570
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol20/iss1/19
BEST APPELLANT BRIEF
the time of its enactment. The intent of Congress, according to the
legislative history, was to overrule the Supreme Court's holding in
SWANCC. Further, the history states that "[Congress] intended
the terms [of the CWA] to cover isolated waters that are important
stopovers for migratory birds. We acknowledged [at the time of
the CWA's enactment] and reacknowledge today, that migratory
birds . . . are instrumentalities of interstate commerce. . . ." S.
Rep. 106-528, p. 23. This language, in that it looks backwards as
well as forward, clearly shows that Congress intended to obliter-
ate the SWANCC holding.
The district court misapplied the law in holding, merely due
to the lack of express language in the statute itself, that there is
no evidence that Congress intended retroactivity. In the absence
of statutory language, the court must look to the legislative his-
tory as required by the Landgraf/Lindh analysis. The district
court itself acknowledged that the legislative history evidenced an
intent of retroactivity. (R. at 6). To fail to apply the amendment
to this case would be to act contrary to the clear intent of Con-
gress. Under the Landgraf/Lindh test, the court cannot do this.
Due to the evidence of congressional intent that the amendment
apply retroactively, the traditional presumption against such ap-
plication has been rebutted and the amendment must be applied
to this case.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONGRESS DID NOT HAVE THE POWER TO
REGULATE WATER POLLUTION IN
SHELDRAKE POND PURSUANT TO THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OR THE TREATY POWERS
GRANTED TO CONGRESS BY THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress has the power
to "regulate commerce ... among the several states." U. S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Com-
merce Clause to mean that Congress may regulate interstate com-
merce if such regulation touches one of three areas: 1) channels of
interstate commerce; 2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce;
3) activities that have a substantial affect on interstate commerce.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). Sheldrake
Pond and the activities that take place there fall into all three of
these categories.
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Congress may also pass such laws as are necessary for the
implementation of treaties entered into by the United States.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). However, "what an act
of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers re-
served to the States, a treaty cannot do." Id. at 432. Neverthe-
less, if a treaty is valid, states are bound by that treaty. Id. at
434. Migratory bird treaties are valid. Furthermore, acts of Con-
gress that protect migratory birds are also valid. Id. at 435.
The district court held that Congress could not regulate iso-
lated waters such as Sheldrake Pond. (R. at 7). The district court
stated that migratory birds were not channels of interstate com-
merce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce, nor did they
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. (R. at 7). The
district court also held that Congress, could not regulate Shel-
drake Pond pursuant to the Treaty Powers using the CWA since
the CWA was not enacted pursuant to the Treaty Powers. (R. at
7).
A. The District Court erred in finding that Congress did not
have the power to regulate Sheldrake Pond under the
Commerce Clause
The district court rejected the Commerce Clause argument as
a whole under the guise of the Court's holding in SWANCC, 531
U.S. 159 (2001). However, the district court did concede that if
Congress intended for the CWA to serve as a protective measure
for migratory birds that the holding in SWANCC would not apply.
(R. at 6). The Court in SWANCC did not address the issue of
whether the Congress, through the Commerce Clause, intended to
regulate isolated ponds. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 684.
Sheldrake Pond is a channel of interstate commerce. A chan-
nel of interstate commerce is any means of transportation or inter-
course used in interstate commerce. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964). Resting-places of migra-
tory birds have been recognized as having a sufficient connection
to interstate commerce to be considered a channel of interstate
commerce. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395
(9th Cir. 1995); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 1984).
Sheldrake Pond has been used as a resting-place for migra-
tory birds for two decades. (R. at 3). For that same period of time
members of BOG have observed some two hundred species of
birds that have stopped and rested at Sheldrake Pond. Id. There-
fore, the district court erred in finding that Sheldrake Pond is not
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a channel of interstate commerce. The district court stated that to
hold Sheldrake Pond out as a channel of interstate commerce
would, in effect, stretch the CWA to all lands in the country since
birds can land virtually anywhere. (R. at 7). This is not so. "Well-
established use or special attractiveness as a migratory bird
habitat creates a substantial connection to interstate commerce."
United States v. Hallmark Construction Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033,
1041 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm'r of
United States Env't Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 260-61 (7th Cir.
1993). In order for other lands to be considered resting- places for
migratory birds, and subject to the CWA, a complaining party
would have to establish that migratory birds are more likely to
use that area than any other. Hallmark Constr. Co., 30 F. Supp.
2d at 1041 (where one of two ponds were preferred by migratory
birds the court held that the one not used is not subject to the
CWA).
Even if Sheldrake Pond was not considered a channel of inter-
state commerce, the birds themselves are instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce. "Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. Migratory
birds have been recognized by the courts to be instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1393-94. Courts
have recognized that millions of dollars are spent each year both
hunting and watching birds. Leslie Salt Co., 55 F.3d at 1394.
Nevertheless, even if the birds are not instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce the firearms used by Suave's clientele are.
Shooters at GRAPA use shotguns to shoot the clay skeet ejected
from GRAPA's platform. There is no evidence in the record that
the shotguns used were not involved in interstate commerce. The
court, when considering a motion for summary judgment, should
take the facts and evidence in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Mize v. Jefferson City Board of Educ., 93 F.3d 739
(11th Cir. 1996).
The purpose of the regulations enacted pursuant to the CWA
are to maintain the integrity of the nation's aquatic ecosystems
through the regulation of dredge or fill materials. 40 C.F.R.
§ 230.1 (2001). Dredge or fill material is classified as a pollutant
under the terms of the regulations, the same as solid waste mater-
ials and munitions. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(o) (2001). Therefore the dis-
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charge from the firearms is an applicable area of regulation under
the CWA.
In 1999, manufacturers in 21 states produced over one million
shotguns. Annual Firearms Manufacturing and Export Report,
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Feb. 8, 2001), at http:ll
www.atf.treas.gov/firearms/stats/index.htm. It is unlikely that all
the shotguns used at the pistol and rifle range were produced
solely within New Union. Although granting BOG and the United
State's motion would also burden interstate commerce, the protec-
tion of interstate commerce should not injure the environment.
National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1056
(D.C. Cir. 1997) [hereinafter NAHB]. The district court erred in
finding that neither the birds nor the firearms used were instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce.
Not allowing Congress to regulate waters like Sheldrake Pond
would also have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The
district court looked to the fact that no out-of-state travelers came
to Sheldrake Pond in determining that the activities at Sheldrake
Pond did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. (R.
at 7). However, the EPA may regulate natural ponds that have
the potential for use by interstate travelers. See Hoffman Homes,
Inc., 999 F.2d at 261; 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3)(iii) (2001). Potential
use by interstate travelers is all that is required. Hoffman Homes,
Inc., 999 F.2d at 261.
There is no argument that the degradation of one small pond
that is used as a resting-place for migratory birds will have a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce. However, small activities
that, when viewed in the aggregate, do substantially affect inter-
state commerce are subject to Congressional regulation. NAHB,
130 F.3d at 1050; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-
28 (1942). The fact that one particular areas "own contribution to
[interstate commerce] may be trivial by itself is not enough to re-
move [that activity] from the scope of federal regulation where...
[such] contribution, taken together with that of many others simi-
larly situated, is far from trivial." Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294, 301 (1964) (quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28). Shel-
drake Pond and the birds that land there provide such a nexus.
To allow all similar migratory bird resting-places around the
country to be encroached upon in a similar manner would sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.
The district court stated that Congress must have intended
for the CWA to touch and concern isolated ponds, pursuant to the
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Commerce Clause, in order for it be applicable. In rejecting the
congressional intent argument the district court stated that the
intent at the time of the CWA's enactment is controlling. Con-
gress intended the CWA to assist in the protection of wildlife as
well as to ensure clean water for the citizens of the United States.
S. Conf. Rep. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3776, 3777. This rationale has resounded through other legisla-
tion enacted pursuant to and in light of the CWA. See Year of
Clean Water, Pub. L. No. 101-424, 104 Stat. 914 (1990). To hold
that Congress did not intend for the CWA to protect migratory
birds ignores the plain intent of Congress at the time the CWA
was enacted. The district court erred in not recognizing that Con-
gress intended for the CWA to protect wildlife in general, and
therefore, protect migratory birds.
B. The District Court erred in finding that Congress could not
regulate Sheldrake Pond pursuant to the Treaty Clause of
the Constitution of the United States
In 1916, the United States entered into a treaty with Great
Britain that provided for the protection of migratory birds. See
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, December 18,
1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702. In 1936, the United States en-
tered into a similar treaty with Mexico. See Convention Between
the United States of America and Mexico for the Protection of Mi-
gratory Birds and Game Mammals, February 7, 1936, U.S.-Mex.,
50 Stat. 1311. Both treaties provide that the United States will
enact whatever laws are necessary to effectuate the treaties. 39
Stat. 1702; 50 Stat. 1311. "Congress has the power to pass such
legislation as is necessary and proper to implement [treaties]."
United States v. Yian, 905 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S. D. N. Y. 1995),
affd sub nomine, United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79 (2d
Cir. N.Y. 1997).
While the CWA does not specifically state that it was enacted
for the purposes of implementing either treaty, Congress has re-
peatedly considered the protection of wildlife in regards to insur-
ing clean water. See S. Rep. No. 99-445 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113; S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236 at 2 (1972), re-
printed in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3777. However, a law enacted
pursuant to a treaty is valid so long as it does not infringe upon
the Constitution. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432. Laws have been en-
acted under these treaties to provide for the protection of migra-
tory birds. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1994). However, other laws
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that do not specifically name the treaty as the justification for en-
acting the statute may serve the purpose of effectuating the
treaty. See also United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir.
1996). "[I]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under Article I, Section 8, as a necessary
and proper means to execute the powers of the Government." Id.
at 1480 (quoting Missouri, 252 U.S. at 383).
The United States has entered into treaties with neighboring
countries not just for the protection of migratory birds, but also for
the protection of wildlife in general. See Annex I to the Agreement
Between the United States and United Mexican States on Cooper-
ation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in
the Boarder Area, August 22, 1990, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S No. 11,269.
The CWA states that part of its purpose is the protection of wild-
life. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994). Therefore, it would appear
that Congress intended that the CWA simply act as another
means of enforcing the several treaties between the United States
and other nations regarding the protection of migratory birds and
other forms of wildlife. Courts have recognized that one of the
purposes of the treaties and the laws enacted in pursuance thereof
was to protect migratory birds as they travel. See Shouse v.
Moore, 11 F. Supp. 784, 785 (E.D. Ky. 1935). Therefore, the pro-
tection of the resting-places of migratory birds is a necessary and
proper means of implementing these various treaties.
So long as the treaty is valid and does not violate the Consti-
tution the statutes enacted as a means to effectuate that treaty
are also valid. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 432. The district court, how-
ever, stated that the Treaty Powers argument was invalid as an
attempt to bypass the regulation of the states through the Com-
merce Clause. (R. at 7). A valid treaty binds the states as well as
the federal government. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 434. "No doubt the
great body of private relations usually fall within control of the
State, but a treaty may override [the states'] power[s]." Id.
The regulations set forth pursuant to the CWA are also appro-
priate for the enforcement of the several wildlife protection trea-
ties entered into by the United States. When Congress acts it
"give[s] to those who were to act under such general provisions
'power to fill up the details' by establishment of administrative
rules and regulations." Shouse, 11 F. Supp. at 787. Therefore, the
district court erred in holding that the CWA, through the Treaty
Powers, was not a valid means of regulating isolated ponds that
serve as resting-places for migratory birds.
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
FIRED SHOT AND SKEET PARTS ARE NOT
SOLID WASTE UNDER 40 C.F.R. § 261.2
Solid waste is defined in the regulations as:
(a)(1) A solid waste is any discarded material that is not ex-
cluded by § 261.4(a) or that is not excluded by variance granted
under §§260.30 and 260.31.
(2) A discarded material is any material which is:
(i) Abandoned...
(b) Materials are solid waste if they are abandoned by being:
(1) Disposed of; or
(2) Burned or incinerated...
40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2001). This regulatory definition of "solid
waste" is narrow and does not apply to lead shot and skeet parts
deposited by Suave at Sheldrake Pond because the materials have
not been "abandoned." See Conn. Coastal Fisherman's Assoc. v.
Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1993). If a material
is found to fall under the regulatory solid waste classification it is,
by definition, hazardous waste. Once materials have been deemed
to be hazardous waste, RCRA's regulatory plan requires those
materials to be handled in accordance with a strict scheme of per-
mitting, manifest tracking requirements, and waste treatment
and handling standards and practices administered by the EPA.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939(e) (1994). Because lead shot and skeet
parts come to rest on the land in and around Sheldrake Pond as a
result of their proper and expected use, they do not fall under the
regulatory permitting scheme. See Long Island Soundkeeper
Fund Inc. v. N.Y. Athletic Club, unreported, 94 Civ. 0436 (RPP),
1996 WL 131863 (S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1996.).
A. Suave's lead shot and skeet parts are not solid waste under
40 C.F.R. § 261.2 because the materials have not been
abandoned
RCRA provides a regulatory scheme to track wastes from
"cradle-to-grave." C&A Carbone, Inc. v. City of Clarkstown, 511
U.S. 383, 408 (1994). Only materials that have been determined
to satisfy the narrow regulatory definition of solid waste (i.e. sub-
title C hazardous wastes) are subject to RCRA regulation as haz-
ardous waste under the subtitle C cradle-to-grave regulatory
scheme. Military Toxics Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C.
Cir. 1998). Subtitle C of RCRA, also known as Subchapter III, is
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titled Hazardous Waste Management and includes sections of
RCRA that call upon the EPA to provide regulations for the identi-
fication and handling of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-
6939(e). The regulations specifically state that "the definition of
solid waste contained in this part applies only to wastes that also
are hazardous for purposes of the regulations implementing subti-
tle C of RCRA." 40 C.F.R. § 261.1 (2001). The EPA has specifi-
cally narrowed the regulatory definition of solid waste for purpose
of implementing subtitle C. Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d 948.
This means the narrow regulatory definition of solid waste will
only apply to those materials which are first deemed to be hazard-
ous waste under RCRA. Although all hazardous waste must first
be solid waste, not all solid waste is hazardous. United Tech.
Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 717, n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In this case,
while the spent ammunition and skeet parts do fall under the
statutory definition as explained below, they do not fall under the
regulatory definition, which encompasses only hazardous waste.
RCRA provides a separate and distinct definition of solid
waste which does not require "abandonment" as the regulatory
definition does. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994). The statutory defini-
tion of solid waste is used to determine if a material is a solid
waste. Once the statutory definition is satisfied a further determi-
nation must be made to see if a material is a subtitle C solid waste
and subject to the strict regulatory scheme.
The statute defines hazardous waste to be a subset of solid
waste, further indicating that a material must be a solid waste
before it can fall under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1994). The
EPA contends lead shot and skeet parts are solid waste under the
broader statutory definition of solid waste. However, there is no
need to make a determination of whether such materials are haz-
ardous waste because even if lead shot and skeet parts were haz-
ardous waste they have not been abandoned and are used for their
intended purpose which excludes them from the regulatory
scheme of RCRA.
The abandonment element in the regulatory definition re-
quires solid waste to be "disposed of." Military Toxics Project, 146
F.3d at 951. However, the statutory definition of "solid waste"
states that any discarded material that poses an imminent and
substantial hazard to the environment may be the subject of a
lawsuit under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA. Id. The EPA
contends that Suave's lead shot has not been abandoned or dis-
posed of by being used for their intended purpose, but do present
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an imminent and substantial hazard by being discarded at Shel-
drake Pond.
In the case of Long Island Soundkeeper Fund Inc. v. N.Y. Ath-
letic Club, unreported, No. 94 Civ. 0436 (RPP), 1996 WL 131863
(S.D.N.Y. March 22, 1996), a federal district court addressed a
case with facts strikingly similar to those of the present case. The
New York Athletic Club was operating a trap shooting range on
Long Island Sound and was sued by the Soundkeeper Fund for
violations of RCRA's statutory and regulatory prohibitions on
solid and hazardous waste disposal. The court held that spent
rounds of ammunition and target fragments did not fall within the
narrow regulatory definition of 40 C.F.R. § 261.2, stating that
these materials were not "discarded material within the meaning
of the regulation, because they [had] not been 'abandoned' as the
term is defined in [40 C.F.R. § 261.2]." Long Island Soundkeeper,
1996 WL 131863 at *25. Under this rationale the court should
find Suave's spent ammunition and skeet parts not to fall under
the definition of solid waste contained in 40 C.F.R. § 261.2.
B. Lead shot and skeet parts used for their intended purpose
are not solid waste under 40 C.F.R. § 261.2
Under RCRA's regulatory scheme, products used in a normal
and intended manner have not been disposed of and do not fall
under the regulatory definition of solid waste. The firing of lead
shot at skeet targets is only for the activity of using those materi-
als for their intended purpose.
"An agency's interpretation of it's own regulations will be ac-
cepted unless it is plainly wrong." General Carbon Co. v. Occ.
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 860 F.2d 479, 483 (D.C. Cir.
1988), See also, e.g., Natural Res. Defense Council v. EPA, 25 F.3d
1063 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
The intended use principal, which runs throughout the regu-
lations, comes from an established EPA principal that materials
involved in application to the land as part of their ordinary man-
ner of use are not solid waste. The EPA "continues to interpret
the RCRA Subtitle C regulations as not extending to products
whose use involves application to the land, or where use necessa-
rily entails land application, when those products are used in their
normal manner." Military Munitions Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 6622,
6630 (1997). In the case of Conn. Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n. v.
Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305 (2nd Cir. 1993), at the re-
quest of the Second Circuit the EPA filed an Amicus Curie brief.
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The brief discussed the Agency's belief that lead shot and skeet
parts are not "solid waste" under the regulatory definition because
they have been used for their intended purpose. Id. at 1315. In
the brief, the EPA asserted the position that regulatory jurisdic-
tion does not apply to products that are deposited on the land in
their ordinary manner of use. 62 Fed. Reg. at 6630. The regula-
tions incorporate this assertion into many of the rules that govern
products that would be useless unless they could be applied to
land. Id. For example, in the regulations governing military
munitions the rule specifically exempts munitions used for their
intended purpose from hazardous waste regulation. 40 C.F.R.
§ 266.202 (2001). This position was upheld by the D.C. Circuit,
which found that the military munitions rule is only one example
of the longstanding interpretation of the regulatory definition of
solid waste as excluding products whose intended use involves ap-
plication to the land. Military Toxics Project, 146 F.3d at 955.
The regulations contain other examples of this principal by stat-
ing that commercial chemical products are not solid waste if they
are applied to the land and that is their ordinary manner of use.
40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2001). While the regulations for mil-
itary munitions and pesticides do not directly apply to the case at
bar, they are just a few examples of the established principal ex-
cluding materials being used for their intended purpose from the
narrow regulatory definition of solid waste.
The lead shot used at the firing range constitutes a product
used for the intended purpose of hitting clay targets. The firing of
the lead shot necessarily requires the product will be applied to
the land on and around Sheldrake Pond. This court should uphold
the longstanding interpretation of the regulations as excluding
products used for their intended purpose and necessarily require
application to the land. As stated above, merely because the prod-
ucts do not fall under the regulatory definition of solid waste does
not mean they do not pose an imminent and substantial hazard to
the environment. A holding that lead shot and skeet parts are not
"solid waste" under the regulatory definition would not bar the
EPA and BOG from seeking relief under the citizen suit provisions
of RCRA which apply the broader statutory definition of solid
waste. For these reasons this court should find lead shot and
skeet parts are not solid waste under the regulatory definition of
this term because they have been used for their intended use.
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
FIRED SHOT AND SKEET PARTS ARE NOT
SOLID WASTE FOR PURPOSES OF 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B)
The broad statutory definition of solid waste applies to citizen
suits brought to abate imminent hazard to health or the environ-
ment. Conn. Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co.,
989 F. 2d 1305, 1315 (2nd Cir. 1993). Solid waste is defined in
RCRA as:
Any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility
and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid,
or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, com-
mercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from commu-
nity activities....
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1994). The lead shot and skeet parts dis-
charged at Suave's shooting range fall under the "other discarded
material" category because they are solid material resulting from
a commercial operation or a community activity which have been
discarded and, therefore, are solid waste under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) (1994).
A. The lead shot and skeet parts discharged by Suave
constitute discarded material under the statutory
definition of solid waste
"This [issue] turns on the meaning of the phrase, 'and other
discarded material,' contained in the statute's definitional provi-
sions." American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1179
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("AMC I"). If the spent ammunition and target
fragments are held to be "other discarded materials" then they
come within the statutory definition of solid waste. "As the Su-
preme Court has often observed, 'the starting point in every case
involving statutory construction is the language employed by Con-
gress."' AMC 1, 824 F.2d at 1183 (quoting, CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S.
367, 377 (1981)). The court must "start with the assumption that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of
the words used." Id. (quoting, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 149 (1984)). "The ordinary, plain-En-
glish meaning of the word 'discarded' is 'disposed of,' 'thrown
away' or 'abandoned."' Id. at 1184. Suave's lead shot and skeet
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parts fit the plain language of the statute as materials that are
being "disposed of' or "thrown away" at Sheldrake Pond.
RCRA does not expressly define the term "discarded" but does
define the term "disposal." The court must examine how Congress
defined the term "disposal" because it is integrated in the plain
meaning of the term "discarded." Disposal is defined as:
the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or
placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any
land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or
any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emit-
ted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground
waters.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (1994). The fired shots and skeet parts which
fall to the ground or in the pond at Suave's facility fit some of the
adjectives listed above, including discharge, deposit, or placing.
The court in AMC I stated that the definitional section of RCRA
made clear Congress' intent because the definition of solid waste
"is situated in a section containing thirty-nine separate, defined
terms." AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1189. "This is definitional specificity
of the first order." Id. The D.C. Circuit court upheld the ruling in
AMC I when it said, "once we have determined a statue's clear
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of
stare decisis. . . ." Ass'n of Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. United States
EPA, 208 F.3d 1047, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting, Maislin In-
dus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990)).
However, "a complete analysis of the statutory term 'discarded'
calls for more than resort to the ordinary, everyday meaning of the
specific language at hand." AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1185. The court in
AMC I stated the "sense in which a term is used in a statute must
be determined by reference to the purpose of the particular legis-
lation." Id. Suave's lead shot and skeet parts clearly fit the plain
meaning of the statutory definition of solid waste, and to deter-
mine RCRA's purpose this court need only look to Congress when
it said:
It is not only the waste by-products of the nation's manufactur-
ing processes with which the committee is concerned; but also
the products themselves once they have served their intended
purposes and are no longer wanted by the consumer. For these
reasons the term discarded materials is used to identify collec-
tively those substances often referred to as industrial, municipal
or post consumer waste; refuse, trash, garbage, and sludge.
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H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491(I), at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6240. Suave's lead shot and skeet parts meet
the criteria of "discarded materials" that have served their in-
tended purpose and are no longer wanted by the consumer. The
intended use principal the EPA has established for the narrow
regulatory definition of solid waste addressed above does not ap-
ply to this broader statutory definition. Congress is clear that
RCRA was enacted to "eliminate the last remaining loophole in
the environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of dis-
carded materials and hazardous wastes." Id. at 4.
B. If this court does not find the plain language of the statute
clear, and does not follow the precedent set by AMC I and
its progeny, the court should defer to the EPA's
interpretation of the statutory definition of solid
waste and give the highest level of deference
The "administrative implementation of a particular statutory
provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that au-
thority." United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2171
(2001). This recent opinion by the Supreme Court in Mead con-
flicts with the longstanding approach regarding agency interpre-
tations developed by the Court in Chevron. The Supreme Court in
Chevron laid out a two-step analysis to review an agencies con-
struction of statutes the agency is required to oversee. See Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). The first step of the Chevron test is whether Congress has
directly spoken on the issue. Chevron 467 U.S. at 842. If Con-
gress has addressed the issue, the analysis ends. Id. However, if
the court finds Congress has not addressed the issue, the second
step of Chevron looks to see if the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843. If the court
finds Congress has not addressed the issue, Chevron deference
should still be given because the agency's interpretation is based
on a permissible construction. Id.
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1. Congress has delegated authority to the EPA to make
rules carrying the force of law and the interpretation
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority
Pursuant to RCRA, the EPA promulgates regulations and es-
tablishes national standards for the management of hazardous
wastes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6911, 6912, 6921-6939(e) (1994). Con-
gress in Subtitle C isolated hazardous waste, a subset of solid
waste, for more stringent regulatory treatment. Conn. Coastal,
989 F.2d at 1315. Congress recognized the serious responsibility
the regulations impose and this is why they required hazardous
waste to be clearly identified. Id. The statute directs the adminis-
trator to create specific "criteria" for the identification and listing
of hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6921. The EPA has done this by
creating regulations for the sole purpose of administering to subti-
tle C hazardous wastes.
The specific provision in the regulation applicable to this case
states "a material which is not defined as a solid waste in [40
C.F.R. § 261.2], or is not a hazardous waste identified or listed in
this part, is still a solid waste... if... in the case of section 7003
[42 U.S.C. § 6973], the statutory elements are established."
Comite Pro Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and
Sewer Authority, 888 F.2d 180, 187 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting, 40
C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(2) (2001)). The court in Comite went on to hold
that because the § 6972(a)(1)(B) citizen suit had not been enacted
yet, the regulation should apply to it as well because the language
is the same as the § 6973 provision. Id. at 187. The court in Con-
necticut Coastal came to the same conclusion when it held "the
broader statutory definition of solid waste applies to citizen suits
brought to abate imminent hazard to health or the environment."
Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1315. This means the regulations, in
an effort to single out subtitle C hazardous wastes, did not want to
leave the door open for those materials that might still pose an
imminent and substantial danger to the environment but are not
hazardous waste under the regulations. Rather, the regulations
specifically point to the statutory definition and its application to
the citizen suit provision of RCRA. Id. at 1314.
Even though the regulatory definition does not apply, materi-
als such as lead shot and skeet parts can still be solid waste under
the imminent hazard suit provisions of RCRA, because the materi-
als are solid waste under the statutory definition. Thus, if the
more stringent requirement of Mead applied, the EPA's adminis-
tration of this provision qualifies for Chevron substantial defer-
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ence because Congress has delegated the authority to the EPA to
make rules carrying the force of law. The EPA has exercised this
authority through its interpretation. Therefore, this court should
find Suave's disposal of lead shot and skeet parts to be solid waste
under RCRA.
2. If the court does not find Congress gave such authority,
the EPA's interpretation still qualifies for Chevron
deference because the interpretation is reasonable
The Supreme Court in Mead addressed Chevron deference
only when it appeared that Congress delegated authority to the
agency to make rules carrying the force of law. Mead, 121 S.Ct. at
2171. Under Mead, if a court does not find that Congress dele-
gated such authority, it must look to "the degree of the agency's
care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and the
persuasiveness of the agency's position." Id. However, the court
in Mead left open the ability of an agency to "administer their
statute case-by-case, 'making law' as they implement their pro-
gram not necessarily through formal adjudication." Id. at 2180
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This means the EPA may chose to admin-
ister their authority over RCRA through the formal process of
rulemaking or do so on a case-by-case basis and still receive Chev-
ron deference.
When evaluating the interpretation of a statute in cases,
courts use the Chevron analysis to determine its reasonableness.
The first step of the Chevron analysis is whether Congress has
directly addressed the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843. The EPA argues above that Congress has directly
addressed this issue, and the first step of Chevron is met, by ex-
amining the plain meaning of the language Congress used in
RCRA. In the alternative that a court finds Congress has not spo-
ken directly on the issue the court must move to the second step of
the Chevron analysis.
The second step of the Chevron analysis is whether the
agency's interpretation is based on a permissible construction of
the statute. Id. Courts have applied the Chevron analysis and
concluded that the EPA's interpretation of the statutory definition
of solid waste is reasonable. Conn. Coastal, 989 F.2d 1305. The
court in Connecticut Coastal, like the present case, considered
whether lead shot and skeet parts were solid waste under the stat-
utory definition of solid waste. The Connecticut Coastal court rec-
ognized the complexity of using different definitions for the term
2002] 585
35
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
solid waste because "[d]ual definitions of solid waste are suggested
by the structure and language of RCRA." Id. at 1315. That court
went on told hold "that the EPA regulations reasonably interpret
the statutory language." Id. This court should follow the same
reasoning in the determination that although two different defini-
tions of solid waste exist, they are clearly distinct, and their appli-
cation to legal issues is unique. Therefore, this court, like the
court in Connecticut Coastal, should find lead shot and skeet parts
do fall under the broad statutory definition of solid waste for pur-
poses of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this brief, the United States respect-
fully requests that this Court affirm in part and reverse in part
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Suave,
Inc. With respect to the district court's holding that shot and
skeet parts are not solid waste under the regulatory definition the
United States requests affirmance. With respect to the district
court's holding that BOG's suit could not be maintained under the
CWA, that Congress does not have jurisdiction to regulate Shel-
drake Pond pursuant to the Commerce Clause and Treaty Powers,
and that fired shot and skeet parts are not solid waste under the
statutory definition contained in RCRA, the United States re-
quests reversal.
APPENDIX
16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994):
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinaf-
ter provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time,
by any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture,
kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell,
offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for
shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or
imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be
transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part,
nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not man-
ufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or in part, of
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the
terms of the conventions between the United States and Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16,
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1916 (39 Stat. 1702), the United States and the United Mexican
States for the protection of migratory birds and game mammals
concluded February 7, 1936, the United States and the Govern-
ment of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in
danger of extinction, and their environment concluded March 4,
1972 and the convention between the United States and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics for the conservation of migratory
birds and their environments concluded November 19, 1976.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994):
Except as otherwise specifically provided, when used in this
chapter:
(1) The term "State water pollution control agency" means the
State agency designated by the Governor having responsibility
for enforcing State laws relating to the abatement of pollution.
(2) The term "interstate agency" means an agency of two or more
States established by or pursuant to an agreement or compact
approved by the Congress, or any other agency of two or more
States, having substantial powers or duties pertaining to the con-
trol of pollution as determined and approved by the
Administrator.
(3) The term "State" means a State, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, Ameri-
can Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(4) The term "municipality" means a city, town, borough, county,
parish, district, association, or other public body created by or pur-
suant to State law and having jurisdiction over disposal of sewage,
industrial wastes, or other wastes, or an Indian tribe or an author-
ized Indian tribal organization, or a designated and approved
management agency under section 1288 of this title.
(5) The term "person" means an individual, corporation, partner-
ship, association, State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body.
(6) The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, inciner-
ator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemi-
cal wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat,
wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and indus-
trial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.
This term does not mean
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(A) "sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the normal
operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces" within the meaning of
section 1322 of this title; or
(B) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association
with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well
used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is ap-
proved by authority of the State in which the well is located, and if
such State determines that such injection or disposal will not re-
sult in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.
(7) The term "navigable waters" means the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas.
(8) The term "territorial seas" means the belt of the seas measured
from the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast
which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking
the seaward limit of inland waters, and extending seaward a dis-
tance of three miles.
(9) The term "contiguous zone" means the entire zone established
or to be established by the United States under article 24 of the
Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
(10) The term "ocean" means any portion of the high seas beyond
the contiguous zone.
(11) The term "effluent limitation" means any restriction estab-
lished by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and
concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other constit-
uents which are discharged from point sources into navigable wa-
ters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including
schedules of compliance.
(12) The term "discharge of a pollutant" and the term "discharge of
pollutants" each means
(A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source,
(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous
zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or
other floating craft.
(13) The term "toxic pollutant" means those pollutants, or combi-
nations of pollutants, including disease-causing agents, which af-
ter discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or
assimilation into any organism, either directly from the environ-
ment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will, on the
basis of information available to the Administrator, cause death,
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations,
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physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduc-
tion) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their
offspring.
(14) The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.
This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges
and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
(15) The term "biological monitoring" shall mean the determina-
tion of the effects on aquatic life, including accumulation of pollu-
tants in tissue, in receiving waters due to the discharge of
pollutants
(A) by techniques and procedures, including sampling of orga-
nisms representative of appropriate levels of the food chain appro-
priate to the volume and the physical, chemical, and biological
characteristics of the effluent, and
(B) at appropriate frequencies and locations.
(16) The term "discharge" when used without qualification in-
cludes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants.
(17) The term "schedule of compliance" means a schedule of reme-
dial measures including an enforceable sequence of actions or op-
erations leading to compliance with an effluent limitation, other
limitation, prohibition, or standard.
(18) The term "industrial user" means those industries identified
in the Standard Industrial Classification Manual, Bureau of the
Budget, 1967, as amended and supplemented, under the category
of "Division D-Manufacturing" and such other classes of signifi-
cant waste producers as, by regulation, the Administrator deems
appropriate.
(19) The term "pollution" means the man-made or man-induced
alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological in-
tegrity of water.
(20) The term "medical waste" means isolation wastes; infectious
agents; human blood and blood products; pathological wastes;
sharps; body parts; contaminated bedding; surgical wastes and po-
tentially contaminated laboratory wastes; dialysis wastes; and
such additional medical items as the Administrator shall pre-
scribe by regulation.
(21) Coastal recreation waters
(A) In general The term "coastal recreation waters" means-
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(i) the Great Lakes; and
(ii) marine coastal waters (including coastal estuaries) that are
designated under section 1313(c) of this title by a State for use for
swimming, bathing, surfing, or similar water contact activities.
(B) Exclusions The term "coastal recreation waters" does not
include-
(i) inland waters; or
(ii) waters upstream of the mouth of a river or stream having an
unimpaired natural connection with the open sea.
(22) Floatable material
(A) In general The term "floatable material" means any foreign
matter that may float or remain suspended in the water column.
(B) Inclusions The term "floatable material" includes-
(i) plastic;
(ii) aluminum cans;
(iii) wood products;
(iv) bottles; and
(v) paper products.
(23) Pathogen indicator The term "pathogen indicator" means a
substance that indicates the potential for human infectious
disease.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994):
(a) Restoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biologi-
cal integrity of Nation's waters; national goals for achievement of
objective
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. In or-
der to achieve this objective it is hereby declared that, consistent
with the provisions of this chapter-
(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(2) it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal
of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation
of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on
the water be achieved by July 1, 1983;
(3) it is the national policy that the discharge of toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts be prohibited;
(4) it is the national policy that Federal financial assistance be
provided to construct publicly owned waste treatment works;
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(5) it is the national policy that areawide waste treatment man-
agement planning processes be developed and implemented to as-
sure adequate control of sources of pollutants in each State;
(6) it is the national policy that a major research and demonstra-
tion effort be made to develop technology necessary to eliminate
the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters, waters of
the contiguous zone, and the oceans; and
(7) it is the national policy that programs for the control of
nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an
expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be
met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of
pollution.
(b) Congressional recognition, preservation, and protection of pri-
mary responsibilities and rights of States
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land
and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the
exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is the policy of Con-
gress that the States manage the construction grant program
under this chapter and implement the permit programs under sec-
tions 1342 and 1344 of this title. It is further the policy of the Con-
gress to support and aid research relating to the prevention,
reduction, and elimination of pollution, and to provide Federal
technical services and financial aid to State and interstate agen-
cies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduc-
tion, and elimination of pollution.
(c) Congressional policy toward Presidential activities with foreign
countries
It is further the policy of Congress that the President, acting
through the Secretary of State and such national and interna-
tional organizations as he determines appropriate, shall take such
action as may be necessary to insure that to the fullest extent pos-
sible all foreign countries shall take meaningful action for the pre-
vention, reduction, and elimination of pollution in their waters
and in international waters and for the achievement of goals re-
garding the elimination of discharge of pollutants and the im-
provement of water quality to at least the same extent as the
United States does under its laws.
(d) Administrator of Environmental Protection Agency to adminis-
ter chapter
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Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter
in this chapter called "Administrator") shall administer this
chapter.
(e) Public participation in development, revision, and enforcement
of any regulation, etc.
Public participation in the development, revision, and enforce-
ment of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or pro-
gram established by the Administrator or any State under this
chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Ad-
ministrator and the States. The Administrator, in cooperation
with the States, shall develop and publish regulations specifying
minimum guidelines for public participation in such processes.
(f) Procedures utilized for implementing chapter
It is the national policy that to the maximum extent possible the
procedures utilized for implementing this chapter shall encourage
the drastic minimization of paperwork and interagency decision
procedures, and the best use of available manpower and funds, so
as to prevent needless duplication and unnecessary delays at all
levels of government.
(g) Authority of States over water
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allo-
cate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be super-
seded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the
further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water
which have been established by any State. Federal agencies shall
co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert
with programs for managing water resources.
42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1994):
As used in this chapter:
(1) The term "Administrator" means the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency.
(2) The term "construction," with respect to any project of con-
struction under this chapter, means
(A) the erection or building of new structures and acquisition of
lands or interests therein, or the acquisition, replacement, expan-
sion, remodeling, alteration, modernization, or extension of ex-
isting structures, and
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(B) the acquisition and installation of initial equipment of, or re-
quired in connection with, new or newly acquired structures or the
expanded, remodeled, altered, modernized or extended part of ex-
isting structures (including trucks and other motor vehicles, and
tractors, cranes, and other machinery) necessary for the proper
utilization and operation of the facility after completion of the pro-
ject; and includes preliminary planning to determine the economic
and engineering feasibility and the public health and safety as-
pects of the project, the engineering, architectural, legal, fiscal,
and economic investigations and studies, and any surveys, de-
signs, plans, working drawings, specifications, and other action
necessary for the carrying out of the project, and
(C) the inspection and supervision of the process of carrying out
the project to completion.
(2A) The term "demonstration" means the initial exhibition of a
new technology process or practice or a significantly new combina-
tion or use of technologies, processes or practices, subsequent to
the development stage, for the purpose of proving technological
feasibility and cost effectiveness.
(3) The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazard-
ous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the envi-
ronment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters,
including ground waters.
(4) The term "Federal agency" means any department, agency, or
other instrumentality of the Federal Government, any indepen-
dent agency or establishment of the Federal Government includ-
ing any Government corporation, and the Government Printing
Office.
(5) The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combina-
tion of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration,
or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, ill-
ness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human
health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, trans-
ported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
(6) The term "hazardous waste generation" means the act or pro-
cess of producing hazardous waste.
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(7) The term "hazardous waste management" means the system-
atic control of the collection, source separation, storage, transpor-
tation, processing, treatment, recovery, and disposal of hazardous
wastes.
(8) For purposes of Federal financial assistance (other than rural
communities assistance), the term "implementation" does not in-
clude the acquisition, leasing, construction, or modification of fa-
cilities or equipment or the acquisition, leasing, or improvement of
land.
(9) The term "intermunicipal agency" means an agency estab-
lished by two or more municipalities with responsibility for plan-
ning or administration of solid waste.
(10) The term "interstate agency" means an agency of two or more
municipalities in different States, or an agency established by two
or more States, with authority to provide for the management of
solid wastes and serving two or more municipalities located in dif-
ferent States.
(11) The term "long-term contract" means, when used in relation
to solid waste supply, a contract of sufficient duration to assure
the viability of a resource recovery facility (to the extent that such
viability depends upon solid waste supply).
(12) The term "manifest" means the form used for identifying the
quantity, composition, and the origin, routing, and destination of
hazardous waste during its transportation from the point of gener-
ation to the point of disposal, treatment, or storage.
(13) The term "municipality"
(A) means a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, or other
public body created by or pursuant to State law, with responsibil-
ity for the planning or administration of solid waste management,
or an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization or Alaska Na-
tive village or organization, and
(B) includes any rural community or unincorporated town or vil-
lage or any other public entity for which an application for assis-
tance is made by a State or political subdivision thereof.
(14) The term "open dump" means any facility or site where solid
waste is disposed of which is not a sanitary landfill which meets
the criteria promulgated under section 6944 of this title and which
is not a facility for disposal of hazardous waste.
(15) The term "person" means an individual, trust, firm, joint
stock company, corporation (including a government corporation),
partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, politi-
cal subdivision of a State, or any interstate body and shall include
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each department, agency, and instrumentality of the United
States.
(16) The term "procurement item" means any device, good, sub-
stance, material, product, or other item whether real or personal
property which is the subject of any purchase, barter, or other ex-
change made to procure such item.
(17) The term "procuring agency" means any Federal agency, or
any State agency or agency of a political subdivision of a State
which is using appropriated Federal funds for such procurement,
or any person contracting with any such agency with respect to
work performed under such contract.
(18) The term "recoverable" refers to the capability and likelihood
of being recovered from solid waste for a commercial or industrial
use.
(19) The term "recovered material" means waste material and by-
products which have been recovered or diverted from solid waste,
but such term does not include those materials and byproducts
generated from, and commonly reused within, an original manu-
facturing process.
(20) The term "recovered resources" means material or energy re-
covered from solid waste.
(21) The term "resource conservation" means reduction of the
amounts of solid waste that are generated, reduction of overall re-
source consumption, and utilization of recovered resources.
(22) The term "resource recovery" means the recovery of material
or energy from solid waste.
(23) The term "resource recovery system" means a solid waste
management system which provides for collection, separation, re-
cycling, and recovery of solid wastes, including disposal of
nonrecoverable waste residues.
(24) The term "resource recovery facility" means any facility at
which solid waste is processed for the purpose of extracting, con-
verting to energy, or otherwise separating and preparing solid
waste for reuse.
(25) The term "regional authority" means the authority estab-
lished or designated under section 6946 of this title.
(26) The term "sanitary landfill" means a facility for the disposal
of solid waste which meets the criteria published under section
6944 of this title.
(26A) The term "sludge" means any solid, semisolid or liquid
waste generated from a municipal, commercial, or industrial was-
tewater treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pol-
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lution control facility or any other such waste having similar
characteristics and effects.
(27) The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, sludge
from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or
air pollution control facility and other discarded material, includ-
ing solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material result-
ing from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural
operations, and from community activities, but does not include
solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dis-
solved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges
which are point sources subject to permits under section 1342 of
Title 33, or source, special nuclear, or byproduct material as de-
fined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat.
923).
(28) The term "solid waste management" means the systematic
administration of activities which provide for the collection, source
separation, storage, transportation, transfer, processing, treat-
ment, and disposal of solid waste.
(29) The term "solid waste management facility" includes-
(A) any resource recovery system or component thereof,
(B) any system, program, or facility for resource conservation, and
(C) any facility for the collection, source separation, storage, trans-
portation, transfer, processing, treatment or disposal of solid
wastes, including hazardous wastes, whether such facility is asso-
ciated with facilities generating such wastes or otherwise.
(30) The terms "solid waste planning", "solid waste management",
and "comprehensive planning" include planning or management
respecting resource recovery and resource conservation.
(31) The term "State" means any of the several States, the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Is-
lands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands.
(32) The term "State authority" means the agency established or
designated under section 6947 of this title.
(33) The term "storage", when used in connection with hazardous
waste, means the containment of hazardous waste, either on a
temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not
to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste.
(34) The term "treatment", when used in connection with hazard-
ous waste, means any method, technique, or process, including
neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or bio-
logical character or composition of any hazardous waste so as to
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neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste nonhazardous,
safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for storage,
or reduced in volume. Such term includes any activity or process-
ing designed to change the physical form or chemical composition
of hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous.
(35) The term "virgin material" means a raw material, including
previously unused copper, aluminum, lead, zinc, iron, or other
metal or metal ore, any undeveloped resource that is, or with new
technology will become, a source of raw materials. (36) The term
"used oil" means any oil which has been-
(A) refined from crude oil,
(B) used, and
(C) as a result of such use, contaminated by physical or chemical
impurities.
(37) The term "recycled oil" means any used oil which is reused,
following its original use, for any purpose (including the purpose
for which the oil was originally used). Such term includes oil
which is re-refined, reclaimed, burned, or reprocessed.
(38) The term "lubricating oil" means the fraction of crude oil
which is sold for purposes of reducing friction in any industrial or
mechanical device. Such term includes re-refined oil.
(39) The term "re-refined oil" means used oil from which the physi-
cal and chemical contaminants acquired through previous use
have been removed through a refining process.
(40) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term
"medical waste" means any solid waste which is generated in the
diagnosis, treatment, or immunization of human beings or ani-
mals, in research pertaining thereto, or in the production or test-
ing of biologicals. Such term does not include any hazardous waste
identified or listed under subchapter III of this chapter or any
household waste as defined in regulations under subchapter III of
this chapter.
(41) The term "mixed waste" means waste that contains both haz-
ardous waste and source, special nuclear, or by-product material
subject to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.).
33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2001):
For the purpose of this regulation these terms are defined as
follows:
(a) The term "waters of the United States" means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
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including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by in-
dustries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(4) of this
section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are them-
selves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1)-(6) of this section.
(8) Waters of the United States do not include prior converted
cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area's status
as prior converted cropland by any other federal agency, for the
purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding
Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA. Waste treatment
systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet
the requirements of CWA (other than cooling ponds as defined in
40 CFR 123.11(m) which also meet the criteria of this definition)
are not waters of the United States.
(b) The term "wetlands" means those areas that are inundated or
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
(c) The term "adjacent" means bordering, contiguous, or neighbor-
ing. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States by
man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes
and the like are "adjacent wetlands."
(d) The term "high tide line" means the line of intersection of the
land with the water's surface at the maximum height reached by a
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rising tide. The high tide line may be determined, in the absence
of actual data, by a line of oil or scum along shore objects, a more
or less continuous deposit of fine shell or debris on the foreshore or
berm, other physical markings or characteristics, vegetation lines,
tidal gages, or other suitable means that delineate the general
height reached by a rising tide. The line encompasses spring high
tides and other high tides that occur with periodic frequency but
does not include storm surges in which there is a departure from
the normal or predicted reach of the tide due to the piling up of
water against a coast by strong winds such as those accompanying
a hurricane or other intense storm.
40 C.F.R. § 230.1 (2001):
(a) The purpose of these Guidelines is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the United
States through the control of discharges of dredged or fill
material.
(b) Congress has expressed a number of policies in the Clean
Water Act. These guidelines are intended to be consistent with
and to implement those policies.
(c) Fundamental to these Guidelines is the precept that dredged or
fill material should not be discharged into the aquatic ecosystem,
unless it can be demonstrated that such a discharge will not have
an unacceptable adverse impact either individually or in combina-
tion with known and/or probable impacts of other activities affect-
ing the ecosystems of concern.
(d) From a national perspective, the degradation or destruction of
special aquatic sites, such as filling operations in wetlands, is con-
sidered to be among the most severe environmental impacts cov-
ered by these Guidelines. The guiding principle should be that
degradation or destruction of special sites may represent an irre-
versible loss of valuable aquatic resources.
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(o):
For purposes of this Part, the following terms shall have the
meanings indicated:
(o) The term "pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, inciner-
ator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemi-
cal wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials not covered
by the Atomic Energy Act, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment,
rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural
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waste discharged into water. The legislative history of the Act re-
flects that "radioactive materials" as included within the defini-
tion of "pollutant" in section 502 of the Act means only radioactive
materials which are not encompassed in the definition of source,
byproduct, or special nuclear materials as defined by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulated under the Atomic
Energy Act. Examples of radioactive materials not covered by the
Atomic Energy Act and, therefore, included within the term "pol-
lutant", are radium and accelerator produced isotopes. See Train
v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1
(1976) ....
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2001):
For purposes of this Part, the following terms shall have the
meanings indicated:
(s) The term "waters of the United States" means:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for
recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in
interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by
industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the
United States under this definition.
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (1) through (4)
of this section;
(6) The territorial sea;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are them-
selves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (s)(1)-(6) of this section;
waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons
designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling
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ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria
of this definition) are not waters of the United States.
Waters of the United States do not include prior converted
cropland. Notwithstanding the determination of an area's status
as prior converted cropland by any other federal agency, for the
purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding
Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.
40 C.F.R. § 261.1 (2001):
(a) This part identifies those solid wastes which are subject to reg-
ulation as hazardous wastes under Parts 262 through 265, 268
and Parts 270, 271, and 124 of this chapter and which are subject
to the notification requirements of section 3010 of RCRA. In this
part:
(1) Subpart A defines the terms "solid waste" and "hazardous
waste", identifies those wastes which are excluded from regulation
under Parts 262 through 266, 268 and 270 and establishes special
management requirements for hazardous waste produced by con-
ditionally exempt small quantity generators and hazardous waste
which is recycled.
(2) Subpart B sets forth the criteria used by EPA to identify char-
acteristics of hazardous waste and to list particular hazardous
wastes.
(3) Subpart C identifies characteristics of hazardous waste.
(4) Subpart D lists particular hazardous wastes.
(b)(1) The definition of solid waste contained in this Part applies
only to wastes that also are hazardous for purposes of the regula-
tions implementing Subtitle C of RCRA. For example, it does not
apply to materials (such as non- hazardous scrap, paper, textiles,
or rubber) that are not otherwise hazardous wastes and that are
recycled.
(2) This Part identifies only some of the materials which are solid
wastes and hazardous wastes under Sections 3007, 3013, and
7003 of RCRA. A material which is not defined as a solid waste in
this Part, or is not a hazardous waste identified or listed in this
Part, is still a solid waste and a hazardous waste for purposes of
these sections if:
(i) In the case of Sections 3007 and 3013, EPA has reason to be-
lieve that the material may be a solid waste within the meaning of
Section 1004(27) of RCRA and a hazardous waste within the
meaning of Section 1004(5) of RCRA; or
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(ii) In the case of Section 7003, the statutory elements are
established.
(c) For the purposes of Sections 261.2 and 261.6:
(1) A "spent material" is any material that has been used and as a
result of contamination can no longer serve the purpose for which
it was produced without processing;
(2) "Sludge" has the same meaning used in §§ 260.10 of this
Chapter;
(3) A "by-product" is a material that is not one of the primary
products of a production process and is not solely or separately
produced by the production process. Examples are process resi-
dues such as slags or distillation column bottoms. The term does
not include a co-product that is produced for the general public's
use and is ordinarily used in the form it is produced by the
process.
(4) A material is "reclaimed" if it is processed to recover a usable
product, or if it is regenerated. Examples are recovery of lead val-
ues from spent batteries and regeneration of spent solvents.
(5) A material is "used or reused" if it is either:
(i) Employed as an ingredient (including use as an intermediate)
in an industrial process to make a product (for example, distilla-
tion bottoms from one process used as feedstock in another pro-
cess). However, a material will not satisfy this condition if distinct
components of the material are recovered as separate end prod-
ucts (as when metals are recovered from metal-containing secon-
dary materials); or
(ii) Employed in a particular function or application as an effective
substitute for a commercial product (for example, spent pickle li-
quor used as phosphorous precipitant and sludge conditioner in
wastewater treatment).
(6) "Scrap metal" is bits and pieces of metal parts (e.g.,) bars, turn-
ings, rods, sheets, wire) or metal pieces that may be combined to-
gether with bolts or soldering (e.g., radiators, scrap automobiles,
railroad box cars), which when worn or superfluous can be
recycled.
(7) A material is "recycled" if it is used, reused, or reclaimed.
(8) A material is "accumulated speculatively" if it is accumulated
before being recycled. A material is not accumulated specula-
tively, however, if the person accumulating it can show that the
material is potentially recyclable and has a feasible means of be-
ing recycled; and that-during the calendar year (commencing on
January 1)-the amount of material that is recycled, or trans-
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ferred to a different site for recycling, equals at least 75 percent by
weight or volume of the amount of that material accumulated at
the beginning of the period. In calculating the percentage of turno-
ver, the 75 percent requirement is to be applied to each material of
the same type (e.g., slags from a single smelting process) that is
recycled in the same way (i.e., from which the same material is
recovered or that is used in the same way). Materials accumulat-
ing in units that would be exempt from regulation under
§§ 261.4(c) are not be included in making the calculation. (Materi-
als that are already defined as solid wastes also are not to be in-
cluded in making the calculation.) Materials are no longer in this
category once they are removed from accumulation for recycling,
however.
(9) "Excluded scrap metal" is processed scrap metal, unprocessed
home scrap metal, and unprocessed prompt scrap metal.
(10) "Processed scrap metal" is scrap metal which has been manu-
ally or physically altered to either separate it into distinct materi-
als to enhance economic value or to improve the handling of
materials. Processed scrap metal includes, but is not limited to
scrap metal which has been baled, shredded, sheared, chopped,
crushed, flattened, cut, melted, or separated by metal type (i.e.,
sorted), and, fines, drosses and related materials which have been
agglomerated. (Note: shredded circuit boards being sent for re-
cycling are not considered processed scrap metal. They are cov-
ered under the exclusion from the definition of solid waste for
shredded circuit boards being recycled (§§ 261.4(a)(13)).
(11) "Home scrap metal" is scrap metal as generated by steel mills,
foundries, and refineries such as turnings, cuttings, punchings,
and borings.
(12) "Prompt scrap metal" is scrap metal as generated by the
metal working/fabrication industries and includes such scrap
metal as turnings, cuttings, punchings, and borings. Prompt scrap
is also known as industrial or new scrap metal.
40 C.F.R. § 266.202:
(a) A military munition is not a solid waste when:
(1) Used for its intended purpose, including:
(i) Use in training military personnel or explosives and munitions
emergency response specialists (including training in proper de-
struction of unused propellant or other munitions); or
(ii) Use in research, development, testing, and evaluation of mili-
tary munitions, weapons, or weapon systems; or
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(iii) Recovery, collection, and on-range destruction of unexploded
ordnance and munitions fragments during range clearance activi-
ties at active or inactive ranges. However, "use for intended pur-
pose" does not include the on-range disposal or burial of
unexploded ordnance and contaminants when the burial is not a
result of product use.
(2) An unused munition, or component thereof, is being repaired,
reused, recycled, reclaimed, disassembled, reconfigured, or other-
wise subjected to materials recovery activities, unless such activi-
ties involve use constituting disposal as defined in 40 CFR
261.2(c)(1), or burning for energy recovery as defined in 40 CFR
261.2(c)(2).
(b) An unused military munition is a solid waste when any of the
following occurs:
(1) The munition is abandoned by being disposed of, burned, deto-
nated (except during intended use as specified in paragraph (a) of
this section), incinerated, or treated prior to disposal; or
(2) The munition is removed from storage in a military magazine
or other storage area for the purpose of being disposed of, burned,
or incinerated, or treated prior to disposal, or
(3) The munition is deteriorated or damaged (e.g., the integrity of
the munition is compromised by cracks, leaks, or other damage) to
the point that it cannot be put into serviceable condition, and can-
not reasonably be recycled or used for other purposes; or
(4) The munition has been declared a solid waste by an authorized
military official.
(c) A used or fired military munition is a solid waste:
(1) When transported off range or from the site of use, where the
site of use is not a range, for the purposes of storage, reclamation,
treatment, disposal, or treatment prior to disposal; or
(2) If recovered, collected, and then disposed of by burial, or
landfilling either on or off a range.
(d) For purposes of RCRA section 1004(27), a used or fired military
munition is a solid waste, and, therefore, is potentially subject to
RCRA corrective action authorities under sections 3004(u) and (v),
and 3008(h), or imminent and substantial endangerment authori-
ties under section 7003, if the munition lands off-range and is not
promptly rendered safe and/or retrieved. Any imminent and sub-
stantial threats associated with any remaining material must be
addressed. If remedial action is infeasible, the operator of the
range must maintain a record of the event for as long as any
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threat remains. The record must include the type of munition and
its location (to the extent the location is known).
40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2001):
(a)(1) A solid waste is any discarded material that is not excluded
by §§ 261.4(a) or that is not excluded by variance granted under
§§§§ 260.30 and 260.31.
(2) A discarded material is any material which is:
(i) Abandoned, as explained in paragraph (b) of this section; or
(ii) Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section; or
(iii) Considered inherently waste-like, as explained in paragraph
(d) of this section; or
(iv) A military munition identified as a solid waste in 40 C.F.R.
266.202.
(b) Materials are solid waste if they are abandoned by being:
(1) Disposed of; or
(2) Burned or incinerated; or
(3) Accumulated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in
lieu of being abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or
incinerated.
(c) Materials are solid wastes if they are recycled-or accumu-
lated, stored, or treated before recycling-as specified in
paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(4) of this section.
(1) Used in a manner constituting disposal.
(i) Materials noted with a "*" in Column 1 of Table I are solid
wastes when they are:
(A) Applied to or placed on the land in a -manner that constitutes
disposal; or
(B) Used to produce products that are applied to or placed on the
land or are otherwise contained in products that are applied to or
placed on the land (in which cases the product itself remains a
solid waste).
(ii) However, commercial chemical products listed in §§ 261.33 are
not solid wastes if they are applied to the land and that is their
ordinary manner of use.
(2) Burning for energy recovery.
(i) Materials noted with a "*" in column 2 of Table 1 are solid
wastes when they are:
(A) Burned to recover energy;
(B) Used to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels (in
which cases the fuel itself remains a solid waste).
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(ii) However, commercial chemical products listed in §§ 261.33 are
not solid wastes if they are themselves fuels.
(3) Reclaimed. Materials noted with a "" in column 3 of Table 1
are solid wastes when reclaimed (except as provided under 40
C.F.R. 20(a)(17)).
(4) Accumulated speculatively. Materials noted with a "*" in col-
umn 4 of Table 1 are solid wastes when accumulated
speculatively.
Table 1
Use Energy Reclamation (§§ Speculative constituting recovery/ 261.2(c)(3)) ac-
cumulation disposal (§§ fuel (§§ (except as (§§ 261.2(c)(1)) 261.2(c)(2)) provided
in 261.2(c)(4)) 261.4(a)(17) for mineral processing secondary materials)
1 2 3 4
Spent M aterials ....................................... (a) (a) (a) (a)
Sludges (listed in 40 CFR Part 261.31 or 261.32 ......... (a) (a) (a) (a)
Sludges exhibiting a characteristic of hazardous waste ... (a) (a) - (a)
By-products (listed in 40 CFR 261.31 or 261.32) .......... (a) (a) (a) (a)
By-products exhibiting a characteristic of hazardous waste (a) (a) - (a)
Commercial chemical products listed in 40 CFR 261.33 ... (a) (a) - -
Scrap metal other than excluded scrap metal (see
261.1(c)(9)) ............................................ (a) (a) (a) (a)
Note: The terms "spent materials," "sludges," "by-products," and "scrap metal"
and "processed scrap metal" are defined in §§ 261.1.
(d) Inherently waste-like materials. The following materials are
solid wastes when they are recycled in any manner:
(1) Hazardous Waste Nos. F020, F021 (unless used as an ingredi-
ent to make a product at the site of generation), F022, F023, F026,
and F028.
(2) Secondary materials fed to a halogen acid furnace that exhibit
a characteristic of a hazardous waste or are listed as a hazardous
waste as defined in subparts C or D of this part, except for bromi-
nated material that meets the following criteria:
(i) The material must contain a bromine concentration of at least
45%; and
(ii) The material must contain less than a total of 1% of toxic or-
ganic compounds listed in appendix VIII; and
(iii) The material is processed continually on-site in the halogen
acid furnace via direct conveyance (hard piping).
(3) The Administrator will use the following criteria to add wastes
to that list:
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(i)(A) The materials are ordinarily disposed of, burned, or inciner-
ated; or
(B) The materials contain toxic constituent listed in Appendix VIII
of Part 261 and these constituents are not ordinarily found in raw
materials or products for which the materials substitute (or are
found in raw materials or products in smaller concentrations) and
are not used or reused during the recycling process; and
(ii) The material may pose a substantial hazard to human health
and the environment when recycled.
(e) Materials that are not solid waste when recycled.
(1) Materials are not solid wastes when they can be shown to be
recycled by being:
(i) Used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process to make
a product, provided the materials are not being reclaimed; or
(ii) Used or reused as effective substitutes for commercial prod-
ucts; or
(iii) Returned to the original process from which they are gener-
ated, without first being reclaimed or land disposed. The material
must be returned as a substitute for feedstock materials. In cases
where the original process to which the material is returned is a
secondary process, the materials must be managed such that
there is no placement on the land. In cases where the materials
are generated and reclaimed within the primary mineral process-
ing industry, the conditions of the exclusion found at
§§ 261.4(a)(17) apply rather than this paragraph.
(2) The following materials are solid wastes, even if the recycling
involves use, reuse, or return to the original process (described in
paragraphs (e)(1) (i)-(iii) of this section):
(i) Materials used in a manner constituting disposal, or used to
produce products that are applied to the land; or
(ii) Materials burned for energy recovery, used to produce a fuel,
or contained in fuels; or
(iii) Materials accumulated speculatively; or
(iv) Materials listed in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section.
() Documentation of claims that materials are not solid wastes or
are conditionally exempt from regulation. Respondents in actions
to enforce regulations implementing Subtitle C of RCRA who raise
a claim that a certain material is not a solid waste, or is condition-
ally exempt from regulation, must demonstrate that there is a
known market or disposition for the material, and that they meet
the terms of the exclusion or exemption. In doing so, they must
provide appropriate documentation (such as contracts showing
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that a second person uses the material as an ingredient in a pro-
duction process) to demonstrate that the material is not a waste,
or is exempt from regulation. In addition, owners or operators of
facilities claiming that they actually are recycling materials must
show that they have the necessary equipment to do so.
42 U.S.C. § 6911 (1994):
(a) Office of Solid Waste
The Administrator shall establish within the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency an Office of Solid Waste (hereinafter referred to as
the "Office") to be headed by an Assistant Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency. The duties and responsibilities
(other than duties and responsibilities relating to research and de-
velopment) of the Administrator under this chapter (as modified
by applicable reorganization plans) shall be carried out through
the Office.
(b) Interagency Coordinating Committee
(1) There is hereby established an Interagency Coordinating Com-
mittee on Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Activities
which shall have the responsibility for coordinating all activities
dealing with resource conservation and recovery from solid waste
carried out by the Environmental Protection Agency, the Depart-
ment of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and all other Fed-
eral agencies which conduct such activities pursuant to this
chapter or any other Act. For purposes of this subsection, the term
"resource conservation and recovery activities" shall include, but
not be limited to, all research, development and demonstration
projects on resource conservation or energy, or material, recovery
from solid waste, and all technical or financial assistance for State
or local planning for, or implementation of, projects related to re-
source conservation or energy or material, recovery from solid
waste. The Committee shall be chaired by the Administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency or such person as the Ad-
ministrator may designate. Members of the Committee shall in-
clude representatives of the Department of Energy, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, and
each other Federal agency which the Administrator determines to
have programs or responsibilities affecting resource conservation
or recovery.
(2) The Interagency Coordinating Committee shall include over-
sight of the implementation of-
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(A) the May 1979 Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Re-
covery from Municipal Solid Waste between the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Department of Energy;
(B) the May 30, 1978, Interagency Agreement between the De-
partment of Commerce and the Environmental Protection Agency
on the Implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901 et seq.]; and
(C) any subsequent agreements between these agencies or other
Federal agencies which address Federal resource recovery or con-
servation activities.
(3) The Interagency Coordinating Committee shall submit to the
Congress by March 1, 1981, and on March 1 each year thereafter,
a five-year action plan for Federal resource conservation or recov-
ery activities which shall identify means and propose programs to
encourage resource conservation or material and energy recovery
and increase private and municipal investment in resource con-
servation or recovery systems, especially those which provide for
material conservation or recovery as well as energy conservation
or recovery. Such plan shall describe, at a minimum, a coordi-
nated and nonduplicatory plan for resource recovery and conser-
vation activities for the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and all
other Federal agencies which conduct such activities.
42 U.S.C. § 6912:
(a) Authorities
In carrying out this chapter, the Administrator is authorized to-
(1) prescribe, in consultation with Federal, State, and regional au-
thorities, such regulations as are necessary to carry out his func-
tions under this chapter;
(2) consult with or exchange information with other Federal agen-
cies undertaking research, development, demonstration projects,
studies, or investigations relating to solid waste;
(3) provide technical and financial assistance to States or regional
agencies in the development and implementation of solid waste
plans and hazardous waste management programs;
(4) consult with representatives of science, industry, agriculture,
labor, environmental protection and consumer organizations, and
other groups, as he deems advisable;
(5) utilize the information, facilities, personnel and other re-
sources of Federal agencies, including the National Institute of
Standards and Technology and the National Bureau of the Cen-
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sus, on a reimbursable basis, to perform research and analyses
and conduct studies and investigations related to resource recov-
ery and conservation and to otherwise carry out the Administra-
tor's functions under this chapter; and
(6) to delegate to the Secretary of Transportation the performance
of any inspection or enforcement function under this chapter re-
lating to the transportation of hazardous waste where such dele-
gation would avoid unnecessary duplication of activity and would
carry out the objectives of this chapter and of the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act.
(b) Revision of regulations
Each regulation promulgated under this chapter shall be reviewed
and, where necessary, revised not less frequently than every three
years.
(c) Criminal investigations
In carrying out the provisions of this chapter, the Administrator,
and duly- designated agents and employees of the Environmental
Protection Agency, are authorized to initiate and conduct investi-
gations under the criminal provisions of this chapter, and to refer
the results of these investigations to the Attorney General for
prosecution in appropriate cases.
42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1994):
(a) Criteria for identification or listing. Not later than eighteen
months after October 21, 1976, the Administrator shall, after no-
tice and opportunity for public hearing, and after consultation
with appropriate Federal and State agencies, develop and promul-
gate criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous
waste, and for listing hazardous waste, which should be subject to
the provisions of this subchapter, taking into account toxicity, per-
sistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation
in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corro-
siveness, and other hazardous characteristics. Such criteria shall
be revised from time to time as may be appropriate.
(b) Identification and listing
(1) Not later than eighteen months after October 21, 1976, and
after notice and opportunity for public hearing, the Administrator
shall promulgate regulations identifying the characteristics of
hazardous waste, and listing particular hazardous wastes (within
the meaning of section 6903(5) of this title), which shall be subject
to the provisions of this subchapter. Such regulations shall be
based on the criteria promulgated under subsection (a) of this sec-
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tion and shall be revised from time to time thereafter as may be
appropriate. The Administrator, in cooperation with the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and the National Toxi-
cology Program, shall also identify or list those hazardous wastes
which shall be subject to the provisions of this subchapter solely
because of the presence in such wastes of certain constituents
(such as identified carcinogens, mutagens, or teratagens) at levels
in excess of levels which endanger human health.
(2)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this sub-
section, drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associ-
ated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil
or natural gas or geothermal energy shall be subject only to ex-
isting State or Federal regulatory programs in lieu of this sub-
chapter until at least 24 months after October 21, 1980, and after
promulgation of the regulations in accordance with subpara-
graphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph. It is the sense of the Con-
gress that such State or Federal programs should include, for
waste disposal sites which are to be closed, provisions requiring at
least the following:
(i) The identification through surveying, platting, or other mea-
sures, together with recordation of such information on the public
record, so as to assure that the location where such wastes are
disposed of can be located in the future; except however, that no
such surveying, platting, or other measure identifying the location
of a disposal site for drilling fluids and associated wastes shall be
required if the distance from the disposal site to the surveyed or
platted location to the associated well is less than two hundred
lineal feet; and
(ii) A chemical and physical analysis of a produced water and a
composition of a drilling fluid suspected to contain a hazardous
material, with such information to be acquired prior to closure
and to be placed on the public record.
(B) Not later than six months after completion and submission of
the study required by section 6982(m) of this title, the Administra-
tor shall, after public hearings and opportunity for comment, de-
termine either to promulgate regulations under this subchapter
for drilling fluids, produced waters, and other wastes associated
with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or
natural gas or geothermal energy or that such regulations are un-
warranted. The Administrator shall publish his decision in the
Federal Register accompanied by an explanation and justification
of the reasons for it. In making the decision under this paragraph,
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the Administrator shall utilize the information developed or accu-
mulated pursuant to the study required under section 6982(m) of
this title.
(C) The Administrator shall transmit his decision, along with any
regulations, if necessary, to both Houses of Congress. Such regula-
tions shall take effect only when authorized by Act of Congress.
(3)(A) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this sub-
section, each waste listed below shall, except as provided in sub-
paragraph (B) of this paragraph, be subject only to regulation
under other applicable provisions of Federal or State law in lieu of
this subchapter until at least six months after the date of submis-
sion of the applicable study required to be conducted under sub-
section (f), (n), (o), or (p) of section 6982 of this title and after
promulgation of regulations in accordance with subparagraph (C)
of this paragraph:
(i) Fly ash waste, bottom ash waste, slag waste, and flue gas emis-
sion control waste generated primarily from the combustion of
coal or other fossil fuels.
(ii) Solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing
of ores and minerals, including phosphate rock and overburden
from the mining of uranium ore.
(iii) Cement kiln dust waste.
(B)(i) Owners and operators of disposal sites for wastes listed in
subparagraph (A) may be required by the Administrator, through
regulations prescribed under authority of section 6912 of this ti-
tle-
(I) as to disposal sites for such wastes which are to be closed, to
identify the locations of such sites through surveying, platting, or
other measures, together with recordation of such information on
the public record, to assure that the locations where such wastes
are disposed of are known and can be located in the future, and
(II) to provide chemical and physical analysis and composition of
such wastes, based on available information, to be placed on the
public record.
(ii)(I) In conducting any study under subsection (f), (n), (o), or (p),
of section 6982 of this title, any officer, employee, or authorized
representative of the Environmental Protection Agency, duly des-
ignated by the Administrator, is authorized, at reasonable times
and as reasonably necessary for the purposes of such study, to
enter any establishment where any waste subject to such study is
generated, stored, treated, disposed of, or transported from; to in-
spect, take samples, and conduct monitoring and testing; and to
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have access to and copy records relating to such waste. Each such
inspection shall be commenced and completed with reasonable
promptness. If the officer, employee, or authorized representative
obtains any samples prior to leaving the premises, he shall give to
the owner, operator, or agent in charge a receipt describing the
sample obtained and if requested a portion of each such sample
equal in volume or weight to the portion retained. If any analysis
is made of such samples, or monitoring and testing performed, a
copy of the results shall be furnished promptly to the owner, oper-
ator, or agent in charge.
(II) Any records, reports, or information obtained from any person
under subclause (I) shall be available to the public, except that
upon a showing satisfactory to the Administrator by any person
that records, reports, or information, or particular part thereof, to
which the Administrator has access under this subparagraph if
made public, would divulge information entitled to protection
under section 1905 of Title 18, the Administrator shall consider
such information or particular portion thereof confidential in ac-
cordance with the purposes of that section, except that such re-
cord, report, document, or information may be disclosed to other
officers, employees, or authorized representatives of the United
States concerned with carrying out this chapter. Any person not
subject to the provisions of section 1905 of Title 18 who knowingly
and willfully divulges or discloses any information entitled to pro-
tection under this subparagraph shall, upon conviction, be subject
to a fine of not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment not to exceed
one year, or both.
(iii) The Administrator may prescribe regulations, under the au-
thority of this chapter, to prevent radiation exposure which
presents an unreasonable risk to human health from the use in
construction or land reclamation (with or without revegetation) of
(I) solid waste from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of
phosphate rock or (II) overburden from the mining of uranium ore.
(iv) Whenever on the basis of any information the Administrator
determines that any person is in violation of any requirement of
this subparagraph, the Administrator shall give notice to the vio-
lator of his failure to comply with such requirement. If such viola-
tion extends beyond the thirtieth day after the Administrator's
notification, the Administrator may issue an order requiring com-
pliance within a specified time period or the Administrator may
commence a civil action in the United States district court in the
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district in which the violation occurred for appropriate relief, in-
cluding a temporary or permanent injunction.
(C) Not later than six months after the date of submission of the
applicable study required to be conducted under subsection (f), (n),
(o), or (p), of section 6982 of this title, the Administrator shall,
after public hearings and opportunity for comment, either deter-
mine to promulgate regulations under this subchapter for each
waste listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph or determine
that such regulations are unwarranted. The Administrator shall
publish his determination, which shall be based on information
developed or accumulated pursuant to such study, public hear-
ings, and comment, in the Federal Register accompanied by an
explanation and justification of the reasons for it.
(c) Petition by State Governor
At any time after the date eighteen months after October 21,
1976, the Governor of any State may petition the Administrator to
identify or list a material as a hazardous waste. The Administra-
tor shall act upon such petition within ninety days following his
receipt thereof and shall notify the Governor of such action. If the
Administrator denies such petition because of financial considera-
tions, in providing such notice to the Governor he shall include a
statement concerning such considerations.
(d) Small quantity generator waste
(1) By March 31, 1986, the Administrator shall promulgate stan-
dards under sections 6922, 6923, and 6924 of this title for hazard-
ous waste generated by a generator in a total quantity of
hazardous waste greater than one hundred kilograms but less
than one thousand kilograms during a calendar month.
(2) The standards referred to in paragraph (1), including stan-
dards applicable to the legitimate use, reuse, recycling, and recla-
mation of such wastes, may vary from the standards applicable to
hazardous waste generated by larger quantity generators, but
such standards shall be sufficient to protect human health and the
environment.
(3) Not later than two hundred and seventy days after November
8, 1984, any hazardous waste which is part of a total quantity gen-
erated by a generator generating greater than one hundred kilo-
grams but less than one thousand kilograms during one calendar
month and which is shipped off the premises on which such waste
is generated shall be accompanied by a copy of the Environmental
Protection Agency Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest form
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signed by the generator. This form shall contain the following
information:
(A) the name and address of the generator of the waste;
(B) the United States Department of Transportation description of
the waste, including the proper shipping name, hazard class, and
identification number (UN/NA), if applicable;
(C) the number and type of containers;
(D) the quantity of waste being transported; and
(E) the name and address of the facility designated to receive the
waste.
If subparagraph (B) is not applicable, in lieu of the description re-
ferred to in such subparagraph (B), the form shall contain the En-
vironmental Protection Agency identification number, or a generic
description of the waste, or a description of the waste by hazard-
ous waste characteristic. Additional requirements related to the
manifest form shall apply only if determined necessary by the Ad-
ministrator to protect human health and the environment.
(4) The Administrator's responsibility under this subchapter to
protect human health and the environment may require the pro-
mulgation of standards under this subchapter for hazardous
wastes which are generated by any generator who does not gener-
ate more than one hundred kilograms of hazardous waste in a cal-
endar month.
(5) Until the effective date of standards required to be promul-
gated under paragraph (1), any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this section generated by any generator during any
calendar month in a total quantity greater than one hundred kilo-
grams but less than one thousand kilograms, which is not treated,
stored, or disposed of at a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal facility with a permit under section 6925 of this title,
shall be disposed of only in a facility which is permitted, licensed,
or registered by a State to manage municipal or industrial solid
waste.
(6) Standards promulgated as provided in paragraph (1) shall, at a
minimum, require that all treatment, storage, or disposal of haz-
ardous wastes generated by generators referred to in paragraph
(1) shall occur at a facility with interim status or a permit under
this subchapter, except that onsite storage of hazardous waste
generated by a generator generating a total quantity of hazardous
waste greater than one hundred kilograms, but less than one
thousand kilograms during a calendar month, may occur without
the requirement of a permit for up to one hundred and eighty
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days. Such onsite storage may occur without the requirement of a
permit for not more than six thousand kilograms for up to two
hundred and seventy days if such generator must ship or haul
such waste over two hundred miles.
(7)(A) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect or
impair the validity of regulations promulgated by the Secretary of
Transportation pursuant to the Hazardous Materials Transporta-
tion Act.
(B) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to affect, modify,
or render invalid any requirements in regulations promulgated
prior to January 1, 1983 applicable to any acutely hazardous
waste identified or listed under this section which is generated by
any generator during any calendar month in a total quantity less
than one thousand kilograms.
(8) Effective March 31, 1986, unless the Administrator promul-
gates standards as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection
prior to such date, hazardous waste generated by any generator in
a total quantity greater than one hundred kilograms but less than
one thousand kilograms during a calendar month shall be subject
to the following requirements until the standards referred to in
paragraph (1) of this subsection have become effective:
(A) the notice requirements of paragraph (3) of this subsection
shall apply and in addition, the information provided in the form
shall include the name of the waste transporters and the name
and address of the facility designated to receive the waste;
(B) except in the case of the onsite storage referred to in para-
graph (6) of this subsection, the treatment, storage, or disposal of
such waste shall occur at a facility with interim status or a permit
under this subchapter;
(C) generators of such waste shall file manifest exception reports
as required of generators producing greater amounts of hazardous
waste per month except that such reports shall be filed by Janu-
ary 31, for any waste shipment occurring in the last half of the
preceding calendar year, and by July 31, for any waste shipment
occurring in the first half of the calendar year; and
(D) generators of such waste shall retain for three years a copy of
the manifest signed by the designated facility that has received
the waste. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as a de-
termination of the standards appropriate under paragraph (1).
(9) The last sentence of section 6930(b) of this title shall not apply
to regulations promulgated under this subsection.
(e) Specified wastes
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(1) Not later than 6 months after November 8, 1984, the Adminis-
trator shall, where appropriate, list under subsection (b)(1) of this
section, additional wastes containing chlorinated dioxins or chlo-
rinated-dibenzofurans. Not later than one year after November 8,
1984, the Administrator shall, where appropriate, list under sub-
section (b)(1) of this section wastes containing remaining haloge-
nated dioxins and halogenated-dibenzofurans.
(2) Not later than fifteen months after November 8, 1984, the Ad-
ministrator shall make a determination of whether or not to list
under subsection (b)(1) of this section the following wastes: Chlo-
rinated Aliphatics, Dioxin, Dimethyl Hydrazine, TDI (toluene di-
isocyanate), Carbamates, Bromacil, Linuron, Organo- bromines,
solvents, refining wastes, chlorinated aromatics, dyes and pig-
ments, inorganic chemical industry wastes, lithium batteries, coke
byproducts, paint production wastes, and coal slurry pipeline
effluent.
(f) Delisting procedures
(1) When evaluating a petition to exclude a waste generated at a
particular facility from listing under this section, the Administra-
tor shall consider factors (including additional constituents) other
than those for which the waste was listed if the Administrator has
a reasonable basis to believe that such additional factors could
cause the waste to be a hazardous waste. The Administrator shall
provide notice and opportunity for comment on these additional
factors before granting or denying such petition.
(2)(A) To the maximum extent practicable the Administrator shall
publish in the Federal Register a proposal to grant or deny a peti-
tion referred to in paragraph (1) within twelve months after re-
ceiving a complete application to exclude a waste generated at a
particular facility from being regulated as a hazardous waste and
shall grant or deny such a petition within twenty-four months af-
ter receiving a complete application.
(B) The temporary granting of such a petition prior to November
8, 1984, without the opportunity for public comment and the full
consideration of such comments shall not continue for more than
twenty-four months after November 8, 1984. If a final decision to
grant or deny such a petition has not been promulgated after no-
tice and opportunity for public comment within the time limit pre-
scribed by the preceding sentence, any such temporary granting of
such petition shall cease to be in effect.
(g) EP toxicity
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Not later than twenty-eight months after November 8, 1984, the
Administrator shall examine the deficiencies of the extraction pro-
cedure toxicity characteristic as a predictor of the leaching poten-
tial of wastes and make changes in the extraction procedure
toxicity characteristic, including changes in the leaching media, as
are necessary to insure that it accurately predicts the leaching po-
tential of wastes which pose a threat to human health and the
environment when mismanaged.
(h) Additional characteristics Not later than two years after No-
vember 8, 1984, the Administrator shall promulgate regulations
under this section identifying additional characteristics of hazard-
ous waste, including measures or indicators of toxicity.
(i) Clarification of household waste exclusion A resource recovery
facility recovering energy from the mass burning of municipal
solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing
of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of
regulation under this subchapter, if-
(1) such facility-
(A) receives and burns only-
(i) household waste (from single and multiple dwellings, hotels,
motels, and other residential sources), and
(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial sources that does
not contain hazardous waste identified or listed under this sec-
tion, and
(B) does not accept hazardous wastes identified or listed under
this section, and
(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established contrac-
tual requirements or other appropriate notification or inspection
procedures to assure that hazardous wastes are not received at or
burned in such facility.
42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994):
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any per-
son may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1)(A) against any person (including (a) the United States, and (b)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, con-
dition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effec-
tive pursuant to this chapter; or
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(B) against any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment; or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator. Any action
under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection shall be brought in the
district court for the district in which the alleged violation oc-
curred or the alleged endangerment may occur. Any action
brought under paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection may be brought
in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred or in the District Court of the District of Columbia. The
district court shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce
the permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibi-
tion, or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain any per-
son who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to
order such person to take such other action as may be necessary,
or both, or to order the Administrator to perform the act or duty
referred to in paragraph (2), as the case may be, and to apply any
appropriate civil penalties under section 6928(a) and (g) of this
title.
(b) Actions prohibited
(1) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this
section-
(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the viola-
tion to-
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and
(iii) to any alleged violator of such permit, standard, regulation,
condition, requirement, prohibition, or order, except that such ac-
tion may be brought immediately after such notification in the
case of an action under this section respecting a violation of sub-
chapter III of this chapter; or
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(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United
States or a State to require compliance with such permit, stan-
dard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order.
In any action under subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section in a court of
the United States, any person may intervene as a matter of right.
(2)(A) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of
this section prior to ninety days after the plaintiff has given notice
of the endangerment to-
(i) the Administrator;
(ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur;
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed or to be contributing to
the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation,
or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in subsec-
tion (a)(1)(B) of this section, except that such action may be
brought immediately after such notification in the case of an ac-
tion under this section respecting a violation of subchapter III of
this chapter.
(B) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section if the Administrator, in order to restrain or abate acts or
conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the
activities which may present the alleged endangerment-
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under
section 6973 of this title or under section 106 of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 [42 U.S.C.A. §§ 604];
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study under section 104 of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 [ 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9604] and is diligently proceeding with a remedial ac-
tion under that Act [42 U.S. C.A.§§ 9601 et seq.]; or
(iv) has obtained a court order (including a consent decree) or is-
sued an administrative order under section 106 of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
980 [ 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 96061 or section 6973 of this title pursuant to
which a responsible party is diligently conducting a removal ac-
tion, Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RIFS), or pro-
ceeding with a remedial action.
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In the case of an administrative order referred to in clause (iv),
actions under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section are prohibited
only as to the scope and duration of the administrative order re-
ferred to in clause (iv).
(C) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section if the State, in order to restrain or abate acts or conditions
which may have contributed or are contributing to the activities
which may present the alleged endangerment-
(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under
subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section;
(ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section 104 of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 [ 42 U.S.C.A.§§ 96041; or
(iii) has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and
Feasibility Study under section 104 of the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 [ 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 96041 and is diligently proceeding with a remedial ac-
tion under that Act [ 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601 et seq.].
(D) No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this
section by any person (other than a State or local government)
with respect to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment, storage,
or a disposal facility, nor to restrain or enjoin the issuance of a
permit for such facility.
(E) In any action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section in a
court of the United States, any person may intervene as a matter
of right when the applicant claims an interest relating to the sub-
ject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the
action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to
protect that interest, unless the Administrator or the State shows
that the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
(F) Whenever any action is brought under subsection (a)(1)(B) of
this section in a court of the United States, the plaintiff shall
serve a copy of the complaint on the Attorney General of the
United States and with the Administrator.
(c) Notice
No action may be commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this sec-
tion prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice to the
Administrator that he will commence such action, except that
such action may be brought immediately after such notification in
the case of an action under this section respecting a violation of
subchapter III of this chapter. Notice under this subsection shall
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be given in such manner as the Administrator shall prescribe by
regulation. Any action respecting a violation under this chapter
may be brought under this section only in the judicial district in
which such alleged violation occurs.
(d) Intervention
In any action under this section the Administrator, if not a party,
may intervene as a matter of right.
(e) Costs
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursu-
ant to this section or section 6976 of this title, may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)
to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the
court determines such an award is appropriate. The court may, if
a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought,
require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(f) Other rights preserved
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any standard or requirement relating to the
management of solid waste or hazardous waste, or to seek any
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State
agency).
(g) Transporters
A transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be
contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, or disposal, re-
ferred to in subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section taking place after
such solid waste or hazardous waste has left the possession or con-
trol of such transporter, if the transportation of such waste was
under a sole contractual arrangement arising from a published
tariff and acceptance for carriage by common carrier by rail and
such transporter has exercised due care in the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal of such
waste.
42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1994):
(a) Authority of Administrator
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt
of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on
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behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court
against any person (including any past or present generator, past
or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a
treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has contributed or
who is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal to restrain such person from such handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such per-
son to take such other action as may be necessary, or both. A
transporter shall not be deemed to have contributed or to be con-
tributing to such handling, storage, treatment, or disposal taking
place after such solid waste or hazardous waste has left the pos-
session or control of such transporter if the transportation of such
waste was under a sole contractural arrangement arising from a
published tariff and acceptance for carriage by common carrier by
rail and such transporter has exercised due care in the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation and disposal
of such waste. The Administrator shall provide notice to the af-
fected State of any such suit. The Administrator may also, after
notice to the affected State, take other action under this section
including, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be neces-
sary to protect public health and the environment.
(b) Violations
Any person who willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply
with, any order of the Administrator under subsection (a) of this
section may, in an action brought in the appropriate United States
district court to enforce such order, be fined not more than $5,000
for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to com-
ply continues.
(c) Immediate notice
Upon receipt of information that there is hazardous waste at any
site which has presented an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to human health or the environment, the Administrator
shall provide immediate notice to the appropriate local govern-
ment agencies. In addition, the Administrator shall require notice
of such endangerment to be promptly posted at the site where the
waste is located.
(d) Public participation in settlements
Whenever the United States or the Administrator proposes to cov-
enant not to sue or to forbear from suit or to settle any claim aris-
ing under this section, notice, and opportunity for a public
meeting in the affected area, and a reasonable opportunity to com-
ment on the proposed settlement prior to its final entry shall be
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afforded to the public. The decision of the United States or the
Administrator to enter into or not to enter into such Consent De-
cree, covenant or agreement shall not constitute a final agency ac-
tion subject to judicial review under this chapter or chapter 7 of
Title 5.
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